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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court is found in Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j)(1988 cum. supp.) whereby the 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the Utah Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. In this 
case final judgment was rendered by the Honorable Dennis 
Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 12th day of April, 1988. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The lower court heard argument and evidence on the State's 
petition. In a memorandum decision dated April 12, 1988, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, District Court Judge, ruled that 
the 1987 Dodge Caravan should be forfeited. (The Memorandum 
Decision is attached as Addendum A). There are two volumes of 
transcripts of the record below. Volume I is referred to with an 
"R" and volume II is referred to with an R.II. The transcripts 
also make reference to the testimony of Officer Steven Olson 
given at the preliminary hearings of Mike Davis and Joan Davis. 
These are attached as Addendum F (Mike Davis) and Addendum G 
(Joan Davis). 
vi 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is the statute on takings, Utah Code Annotated Section 
58-37-13 (1953 as amended) as applied to this case 
unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions 
because the results are grossly disproportionate to the crime? 
2. Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987 Dodge 
Caravan supported by the facts of this case and the plain intent 
of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13? 
3. Is there a security interest that prohibits forfeiture 
in this case? 
4. May Officer William McCarthy's testimony be given in 
civil proceedings if the State relies on statements made during 
criminal custody but before a Miranda warning was issued? 
5. Does the warrantless seizure of the 1987 Dodge Caravan 
invalidate the proceedings below? 
vii 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
[Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution: 
[Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments,] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Person arrested or 
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article If Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1987) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 reads in pertinent 
part: 
(l)(e) all conveyances including aircraft, 
vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment of property described in Subsections (l)(a) 
or (l)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as 
a common carrier in the transaction of 
business as a common carrier may not be 
forfeited under this section unless it 
viii 
appears that the owner or other person in 
charge of the conveyance was a consenting 
party or privy to violation of this act; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited 
under this section by reason of any act or 
omission committed or omitted without the 
owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a 
conveyance subject to a bona fide 
security interest is subject to the 
interest of a secured party who 
could not have known in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence 
that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
• • • • 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act 
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon 
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may be 
made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection under an 
administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a 
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this 
act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property has been used or intended to 
be used in violation of this act. . . . 
The complete text of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (1988 Cum. 
Supp) is attached as Addendum B. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN E. DAVIS, et al., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
No. 88-282 
Priority 14(b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dennis 
Frederick presiding. The State of Utah sought the forfeiture of 
a 1987 Dodge Caravan on the basis that it had been used in the 
transportation of one quarter (1/4) ounce of marijuana, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). The 
District Court allowed that forfeiture. This appeal is to 
determine whether the lower court abused its discretion in 
allowing the forfeiture of the vehicle. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant desires that the lower court's decision be 
reversed, that Appellants' property (or its approximate value) be 
ordered returned, and that this case be remanded with 
instructions either to dismiss the case or provide appellant with 
a new hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of January 19, 1988, Salt Lake City Police 
Officers entered the residence of Joan E. Davis and Gerald Davis 
at 140 West Gregson Ave., Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. At that time said Police Officers arrested Joan E. 
Davis and took possession of a 1987 Dodge Van, License # Utah 
720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096. The 1987 Dodge van was in the 
driveway of the Davis' residence. The van was purchased in May 
of 1987 from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City, Utah for 
approximately $15,500 (R. 56-57). 
The taking of the vehicle was carried out without a valid 
search warrant (R.II. 54-55 and Preliminary Hearing Transcript of 
Joan Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14). Moreover, the 
seizure of the vehicle occurred on January 19, 1988, over five 
months after the alleged marijuana transaction involving the van 
took place on August 4, 1987. * The facts involving the purchase 
of the marijuana transaction are in dispute and are developed in 
detail in Point II, infra. Not in dispute, however, is that 
Appellant Joan Davis did not sell, purchase, exchange money, or 
volunteer to get marijuana (R.II. 20-23). At the most, Joan 
Davis was only present to purchase marijuana for her own 
consumption (R.II. 5-6). 
In purchasing the vehicle, Appellant's husband, Gerald Davis 
borrowed $10,500 from Rosalee Hansen (R. 7, 35-36, 57 ). On May 
9, 1987, Gerald Davis signed a contract with Rosalee Hansen for 
the loan of $10,500 and agreed to pay her $250 per month at 5% 
interest until the loan was paid in full (R. 36-37, 57) (See 
1
 The information and affidavit of Officer Olson states 
that the alleged transaction took place on August 8, 1987. (See 
Addendum D). Testimony of Officer Olson supports that the 
alleged transaction occurred on August 4, 1987, not August 8. 
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Addendum C). Gerald Davis further agreed to give the title of 
the vehicle to Rosalee Hansen as security for the payment of the 
loan (R. 58). Gerald Davis had made the monthly payments noted 
since May 1987 to April 1988 (R.58). 
Gerald Davis has an ownership interest in the van even 
though his name does not appear on the title. Furthermore, 
Gerald Davis had no knowledge nor did he consent to any 
controlled substance violation as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) (R. 60). 
Rosalee Hansen has a bona fide security interest in the 
Dodge Van vehicle identified above. This security interest came 
about when Rosalee Hansen loaned $10,500 to Gerald Davis to 
purchase said vehicle. The loan was made on or about May 9, 1987 
and Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis signed a Security Agreement 
attesting this (R. 36, 57) (Addendum C). Gerald Davis deposited 
$9,000 of the $10,500 in his bank account (R. 73) (the other 
$1,500 was used to purchase a used truck). 
On or about June 16, 1987 the title to the vehicle 
identified above was signed over to Rosalee Hansen by Appellant 
Joan Davis (R. 8-9). This was done as part of the Security 
Agreement and the duly executed title was given to Rosalee Hansen 
to hold pending full payment of the $10,500 loan. Rosalee Hansen 
claims an interest in the vehicle identified above to the extent 
of her unpaid loan in the amount of $8,663.50 (R. 38). Rosalee 
Hansen had no knowledge nor did she consent to any alleged 
controlled substances violation or involvement as contemplated by 
3 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (R. 39). 
Joan E. Davis had no knowledge nor did she consent to any 
alleged controlled substance violation or involvement as 
contemplated by Section 58-37-13 (R. 13-14, 20). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Forfeiture proceedings must be reviewed on a case by case 
basis. There are instances where the result of forfeiture may be 
so great that the punishment is grossly disproportionate to crime 
charged violating both the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Joan Davis did participate in the 
transportation and distribution of marijuana as contemplated by 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended), the result of 
forfeiture exceeds the constitutional bounds of permissible 
fines. 
Further, forfeiture is not supported by the facts of this 
case. The State of Utah's key witness, Officer Olson, 
contradicted himself on the witness stand and in his written 
reports. Joan Davis' testimony is supported by the testimony of 
two other individuals. Joan Davis had no part or knowledge of 
the drug transaction that occurred on August 4, 1987 which is the 
subject of this appeal. 
Even should this Court find Officer Olson's testimony more 
credible and convincing than Ms. Davis', Mike Davis', and Kevin 
Canham's, Officer Olson's testimony clearly indicates that Ms. 
Davis' alleged participation did not rise to the level of 
transportation to accomplish possession, but rather only to 
4 
transportation with possession. Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 
is intended to strike at individuals involved in the trafficking 
of drugs. At most, Ms. Davis' alleged activity is one of a 
purchaser, agent, or one making an "accommodation call." Utah's 
forfeiture statute is not intended to strike at such individuals. 
The result of forfeiture also violates the rights of Gerald 
Davis and Rosalee Hansen. Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen both 
had a bona fide security interest in the 1987 Dodge Van. Utah's 
forfeiture statute protects such individuals and nowhere requires 
that the security interest be perfected. 
Further, a statement Joan Davis made while in custody 
without a Miranda warning was used during the forfeiture 
proceeding as proof that Joan Davis was the sole owner of the 
1987 Dodge Van and was relied on in the district court's final 
ruling. This statement was incomplete as was the questioning 
which prompted the response and should not have been allowed 
since evidence which is obtained in violation of the fourth 
amendment may not be relied on to sustain a forfeiture. 
Finally, the seizure of the 1987 Dodge Van occurred on 
January 19, 1988 over five months after the alleged August 4, 
1987 transaction. Police officers seized the van without a 
warrant. Utah's forfeiture statute requires a warrant to 
accomplish seizure of a vehicle with limited exceptions that are 
not applicable in this case. A warrantless seizure is in 
violation of Ms. Davis' rights under both the Utah and United 
States Constitutions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RESULT OF FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED SECTION 58-37-13 (1953 AS AMENDED} IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS GROSSLY 
DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIME CHARGED. 
A* THE PENALTY OF FORFEITURE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
DISPROPORTIONATE IN THIS CASE. 
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted." Similarly, Article I, Section 9 of the Utah 
Constitution provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required; 
excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall 
not be treated with unnecessary rigor." 
Forfeiture under Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 (1988 
Cum. Supp) is clearly "punishment" as that term is used in the 
eighth amendment. Additionally, forfeiture, although punishment, 
has been upheld in Utah as proper civil punishment regardless of 
the amount involved in a drug transaction or the profit motive. 
See State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe AraveK 717 P.2d 1338 (Utah 
1986) (overruling in part State v. One (1) Porsche 2-Door, 526 
P.2d 917 (Utah 1974)); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 
735 P.2d 392 (Utah 1987). The United States Supreme Court has 
held that the eighth amendment "prohibits not only barbaric 
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the 
crime committed." See U.S. v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)). 
6 
This Court has previously stated that "As for the small 
amount of drugs involved, v[t]he courts have uniformly held that 
a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how small the 
quantity of contraband found.'" State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe 
Arave), 111 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted). 
Arguments have been proposed and upheld, however, that forfeiture 
may exceed constitutional bounds and courts must look at the 
results of forfeiture to determine if forfeiture is violative of 
the eighth amendment.2 The time is ripe for the Utah Supreme 
Court to make such a consideration and determine if in this case 
the fine of forfeiture exceeds constitutional bounds. 
In U.S. v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) the 
defendant was convicted of federal racketeering provisions and 
his business interests were ordered forfeited. The 9th Circuit 
determined that even though the forfeiture statute provided no 
discretion, "the district court must avoid unconstitutional 
results by fashioning forfeiture orders that stay within 
constitutional bounds." Busher 817 F.2d at 1415 (emphasis 
added). 
In determining whether a forfeiture order is so 
disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment, the 9th 
Circuit stated a district court must, consistent with Solem, 
"consider (1) the harshness of the penalty in light of the 
gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed for other offenses 
2
 One such court is the Ninth Circuit. The Utah Supreme 
Court cited One 1976 Porsche 911 S, 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979) 
in reaching its decision in One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338. 
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in the federal system; and (3) sentences imposed for the same or 
similar offenses in other jurisdictions. Ld. (citing Salem, 463 
U.S. at 292). The 9th Circuit has added that a court is not 
limited to the factors specifically mentioned in Busher, but may 
take into account other relevant considerations. U.S. v. 
Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining that in 
forfeiture of property used to cultivate marijuana a court may 
consider the value of the illegal drugs cultivated on the 
property, and the nexus between the portion of the property 
actually used to grow the marijuana plants and the rest of the 
land). 
This case is appropriate for this Court to determine if 
similar discretion is to be given to forfeiture proceedings under 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13. Assuming, arguendo, a $35.00 marijuana 
purchase did take place in appellant's van, forfeiture of the van 
went beyond constitutional bounds. The State's chief witness, 
Officer Steve Olson (the involved undercover narcotics agent) 
testified that Appellant Joan Davis drove them to a home where 
Appellant, Olson, Appellant's son Mike and his two friends Walt 
King and Kevin Canham could acquire marijuana. Olson testified 
that Joan Davis' son, Mike, left the van and entered an apartment 
where he purchased marijuana (Olson has given different accounts 
of the transaction itself, see Point II and defense counsel's 
closing argument at R. 79-81), and that upon Mike Davis' return 
to the van, Appellant divided 1/4 an ounce of marijuana into two 
1/8 ounce portions while all parties were sitting in the van 
8 
(Appellant denies these allegations) (R.II. 9). Upon calling 
Appellant at her home on a later occasion and stating he wanted 
to buy marijuana from her son, Appellant informed Officer Olson 
that her son didn't sell marijuana (R. 14). 
The harshness of the penalty in light of the gravity of the 
offense in this case is severe and in violation of both the 
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Appellant (at time of 
appeal) is still awaiting a criminal prosecution carrying a 
potential penalty of five years in prison and a $5,000 fine. In 
addition to this penalty, Appellant has forfeited her van 
recently purchased at the time of the arrest for approximately 
$15,500. 
B. THE ACTIVITY OF MS. DAVIS AND THE 1987 DODGE VAN IS NOT 
OF THE TYPE CONSIDERED BY THE UTAH FORFEITURE STATUTE; 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE FORFEITURE IS 
EXCESSIVE AND VIOLATES THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS• 
Appellant's activity, as alleged by Officer Olson, does not 
rise to the level of transportation and distribution as required 
by Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). Although 
Officer Olson's police report alleges that he purchased marijuana 
from the "defendant," when questioned about this at the 
forfeiture proceedings, Officer Olson clarified that "defendant" 
meant the parties involved. Officer Olson testified that when he 
asked Mike Davis what his mother was doing with him, Mike Davis 
told him that she was there to buy some marijuana for herself. 
Officer Olson did not purchase marijuana from Joan Davis. (R.II 
9 
20-23) • Officer Olson never asked Joan Davis if she would get 
the marijuana (R.II. 20). Joan Davis never volunteered to get 
the marijuana (R.II. 21). Joan Davis never paid Olson for the 
marijuana and Officer Olson never gave Joan Davis money to get 
marijuana (R.II. 21). Joan Davis' alleged involvement and the 
alleged involvement of her van never went beyond that of personal 
purchase. Neither Joan Davis nor her van were involved in the 
distribution and transportation of marijuana within the intent 
and purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13. (See also Point 
II infra.) 
As the activity did not rise to the level of distribution 
and transportation for purposes of the statute, the sentence 
imposed does not fit the purpose of the Utah Forfeiture Statute. 
The alleged activity of Joan Davis does not meet the imposed 
sentence under the Utah statute and fails to meet forfeiture 
statutes in other federal or state jurisdictions because 
distribution and transportation are threshold elements to 
forfeiture. Joan Davis, if involved, was nothing more than a 
consumer. Neither she nor the 1987 van were necessary to the key 
transaction all of which took place outside the van. 
These facts do not support that Appellant was aware of and 
supporting her son in drug dealing activities. The evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. State 
v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah 1987) 
(upholding forfeiture because evidence was not sufficiently 
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt). Consequently, the penalty 
of forfeiture is harsh and unduly disproportionate and should be 
reversed since it is an excessive fine in violation of the Utah 
and United States constitutions• 
Appellant has been criminally charged with a single 
violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(i)(a)(ii) (1953 as 
amended), a third degree felony carrying a potential penalty of 
five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. Under the 
circumstances of this case, to permit a civil fine to exceed the 
criminal penalty by 300 per cent is disproportionate and unduly 
harsh and exceeds the bounds of the Utah and United States 
Constitution. "Forfeitures are not favored and should be 
enforced only when within both the letter and the spirit of the 
law." United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, Etc., 453 F.Supp. 
639, 643 (D.Colo. 1978). This case does not fall within the 
purpose of the forfeiture statute. 
Assuming arguendo that Appellant did divide marijuana into 
two bags, the State's evidence indicates that the one eighth an 
ounce of marijuana that Joan Davis received was strictly for 
personal consumption and was not for distribution for erstwhile 
law merchant principles. Appellant was led to believe that 
Officer Olson was her son's friend. Upon being contacted by 
Olson later, Appellant answered his request for marijuana by 
stating that her son did not sell marijuana (R. 14). The facts 
as presented by the State are inconsistent with the proposition 
11 
that Appellant and the 1987 Dodge van were involved in the 
transportation and distribution of drugs beyond the personal 
consumption of Appellant's son and his friends. To hold that the 
1987 Dodge Van is subject to forfeiture is to subject any vehicle 
that contains marijuana, with no de minimis exception, to 
forfeiture. 
Further, the ruling in this case is unduly harsh to Gerald 
Davis. Gerald Davis relied on a personal loan from Rosalee 
Hansen to purchase the van. To seize the van is to ultimately 
punish Gerald Davis. (See Point III, infra.) Gerald Davis has 
an ownership interest in the van even though his name does not 
appear on the title. Furthermore, Gerald Davis had no knowledge 
nor did he consent to any controlled substance violation as 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) 
(R. 60 ). (See also Point III infra.) 
Appellant requests that Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 
be applied in principles of equity together with constitutional 
results. Forfeiture in this case is grossly disproportionate in 
consideration of the factual circumstances surrounding this case 
and is a fine that exceeds constitutional bounds. 
The activity in this case does not merit forfeiture under 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-13 since the facts do not rise to 
the required level of activity and to uphold forfeiture is unduly 
harsh to Joan and Gerald Davis and to Rosalee Hansen. 
Consequently, Joan Davis asks that this Court reverse the ruling 
of the lower court and remand this case for dismissal. 
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II. FORFEITURE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND 
VIOLATES THE PLAIN INTENT OF THE UTAH FORFEITURE STATUTE, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 58-37-13, 
In State v. One Porsche 2-Dr., I.P. No. 911211026, 
T.PP10026F, Etc., 526 P.2d 917, 918-19 (Utah 1974) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave), 717 P.2d 
1338 (Utah 1986) to extent that profit motive is not a 
consideration in a forfeiture proceeding) this Court declared: 
It appears obvious that the primary and sole purpose of 
the statute and the intent of the legislature were 
directed exclusively toward the transportation of a 
controlled substance for distribution according to 
erstwhile law merchant principles, and not for personal 
possession and consumption. 
The statute is transportation to accomplish possession, 
not simply transportation "with" possession,—where the 
obvious purpose of the statute is an interdiction 
against transportation for the accomplishment of 
distribution through pushers, pimps or pirates,—not to 
accomplish a forfeiture because one has a marijuana 
cigarette in his pocket or mouth, headed for 
Disneyland,—or Arches National Monument. 
One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d at 1340 affirmed this principle: 
We affirm that the major thrust of the statute is to 
strike at those involved in the trafficking of drugs, 
rather than at the individual whose possession is 
solely for his own consumption. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Joan Davis and the 1987 Dodge Van 
were involved in a drug transaction the facts of this case as 
supported by the testimony of Officer Steven Olson and the 
individuals that were in the van establish that any action that 
involved Joan Davis did not go beyond personal possession and 
consumption, nor did such actions go beyond transportation "with" 
possession. Joan Davis' activities were not for the trafficking 
of drugs, but rather, as Officer Olson testified, Joan Davis was 
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there to purchase marijuana for her own consumption (R.II. 5-6). 
The facts in this case do not support that Joan Davis was 
transporting drugs with an intent to distribute according to 
erstwhile law merchant principles. See State v. One 1982 Silver 
Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding 
forfeiture because there was transportation with an intent to 
distribute "according to erstwhile law merchant principles."). 
Consequently, the decision of the lower court approving 
forfeiture should be reversed. 
Joan Davis testified that she had stopped by Mr. Randy 
Bachman's home to find out when her son Mike was coming home for 
dinner.3 she was showing off her van to Mike, Walt King, and 
Kevin Canham when they asked for a ride (R. 12). 
Joan Davis testified that her son, Mike, and his friend, 
Walt King, got out of the van at what Officer Olson stated was 
approximately Second East and 2800 South in Salt Lake City (R.II. 
8). Joan Davis had no idea what they were doing (R. 13). Joan 
stated that the two came back to the van and Joan took them back 
to Mr. Bachman's house. The van never stopped, Joan had no 
knowledge of marijuana and knew of no marijuana being split or 
smoked in the van (R. 13-14). 
Upon being contacted by Officer Olson on a later date so 
that he could purchase marijuana, Joan Davis told him "I hope 
J
 The individual named Randy is referred to in the various 
transcripts as Randy Bachman, Randy Kanab, Randy McNabb, and 
Randy Packman. For purposes of this appeal, Appellant refers to 
him as Randy Bachman. 
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not. Mike doesn't sell that." When he called again she even 
told him that Mike was not at home even though he was (R. 14). 
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to 
support a charge of distribution of a controlled substance, the 
relevant concern is whether the defendant performed, consented 
to, offered, or arranged the actual sale of a controlled or 
counterfeited substance, or merely acted as an agent between the 
buyer and the source. "The latter action does not fall within 
the prohibition of distribution of a controlled substance for 
value." See State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 134 (Utah 1986) and State 
v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1983)). Assuming, 
arguendo, that Ms. Davis did drive across town so that she, her 
son, and her son's friends could purchase one-quarter ounce 
($20.00) worth of marijuana, Ms. Davis' actions cannot be 
extended beyond a mere "accommodation call." See Wright, 744 
P.2d at 320 (defining distribution of a controlled substance). 
To hold Joan Davis in violation of 58-37-13 and subject to 
forfeiture is to establish that any individual that purchases 
marijuana in a home and drives with it in her car is subject to 
having her car forfeited. Joan Davis' alleged activity does not 
rise beyond transportation "with" possession. 
Kevin Canham was with Mike Davis and Officer Olson on August 
4, 1987. (R 30). Mr. Canham testified that Ms. Davis drove her 
van to an apartment and that he, Mike, Officer Olson and Walt 
King were in van. Upon arriving at the apartment, Kevin Canham 
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testified that Mike Davis and Walt King got out. (R. 30). 
When Mike and Walt King returned to the van, Kevin Canham 
testified that Joan returned them all to Randy's where the young 
men all went in a shed behind the building to divide the 
marijuana (R. 30). Mr. Canham testified that there was never any 
discussion as to why they were going, there was no dividing of 
marijuana, and there was no smoking of marijuana (R. 31). Kevin 
Canham testified that he didn't know marijuana was going to be 
purchased on this occasion and that after the marijuana was not 
brought out to be split up until the group, absent Ms. Davis, 
were in Randy Bachman's backyard. There, the marijuana was 
divided in Mr. Canham's presence (R. 32). 
Officer Olson, upon whose testimony the state relied in 
obtaining forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van, contradicted himself 
on numerous occasions. Joan Davis' attorney opposed and 
summarized these contradictions on the record (R. 79-81). They 
are discussed in detail here: 
On August 4, 1987, Officer Steven Olson was working as an 
undercover officer on Metro Narcotics Strike Force. (R.II. 2). 
Officer Olson stated he met Joan Davis through contact with son, 
Mike, at Randy Bachman's, 331 South Sioux St. Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R.II. 4) Olson later testified that on August 4, 1987 he, 
Joan Davis, Mike Davis, and Walt King (Kevin Canham was not 
included as being in the van) drove to several places to attempt 
to purchase marijuana (R.II. 7). Ultimately, a marijuana 
purchase was made at approximately 2nd East 2800 South, Salt Lake 
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County. Officer Olson had given Mike $35.00 so that Mike could 
purchase marijuana for Officer Olson. Officer Olson testified 
that Mike Davis exited the van, purchased the marijuana, returned 
to the van, and at that time Appellant Joan Davis drove the group 
out of parking lot to about 215 East 2850 South where Ms. Davis 
dumped marijuana out onto a round tray and divided it (R.II. 9). 
Officer Olson then testified that Ms. Davis had pushed Olson's 
marijuana into a baggie and put her's into a white sheet of paper 
(R.II. 10). 
Olson stated that Mike Davis took the marijuana, loaded some 
into a pipe and that the pipe was passed around the van to Joan, 
Mike, Walt King and Olson. (R.II. 10-11). At another point 
Olson admitted he had testified to not recalling who lit the pipe 
(R.II. 19). The police report makes no mention of any marijuana 
being smoked. Officer Olson was also confused whether the 
marijuana was scraped onto a rounded orange tray or onto a silver 
tray (R.II. 20). After the marijuana was divided, Officer Olson 
stated that Joan Davis returned the group to Randy Bachman's 
house at 3331 S. Sioux St (R.II. 10). 
Officer Olson also stated he was positive that Mike Davis 
was the only one that went in to purchase the marijuana (R.II. 
12). The police report and information indicated that both Mike 
Davis and Walt King went into the apartment (R.II. 13, 15) (See 
Addendum D). 
Further, Officer Olson's sworn affidavit (information) says 
the event took place on the 8th of August. At the hearing, 
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Officer Olson agreed that the alleged transaction could only have 
taken place on August 4th (R.II. 17). 
Officer Olson also admitted that he never asked Joan Davis 
if she would get the marijuana (R.II. 20), that Joan Davis never 
volunteered to get the marijuana (R.II. 21), That Joan Davis 
never paid Olson for marijuana, and that he never gave Joan Davis 
money to get marijuana (R.II. 21). 
Officer Olson had purchased marijuana from Mike Davis on two 
other occasions. The routine was to return to Randy Bachman's 
where the marijuana was divided in the shed or in the house 
(R.II. 22). On no occasion did Officer Olson ever purchase 
marijuana from Joan Davis (R.II. 23). 
However, Officer Olson's affidavit and probable cause 
statement against Joan Davis (solely) says that he purchased 
marijuana from the "defendant." The court dismissed defense 
counsel's objection as quibbling about terms (R.II. 26). This is 
a relevant fact, however, because it is the only possible fact 
that directly links Joan Davis to distribution and transportation 
for purposes of Utah's forfeiture statute. Assuming, arguendo, 
that the remainder of the information is true, by Officer Olson's 
testimony Joan Davis is nothing more than one in possession of 
marijuana—a mother who tagged along to collect (there is no 
evidence that she purchased) marijuana for her own personal 
consumption (R.II 5-6). There is no fact to support that Joan 
Davis purchased, sold, distributed, or transported marijuana for 
purposes of the statute on forfeiture (R.II 20-23). 
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Mike Davis testified that he knew Officer Olson as Mike 
Abershell (R.II 33). Mike Davis was working at Randy Bachman's 
when Olson came wanting to purchase one-quarter (1/4) ounce of 
marijuana (R.II. 35). Mike Davis asked his mother, who had 
pulled up to see when Mike would be home for dinner, for a ride. 
Mike, Officer Olson, Walt King, and Kevin Canham got in the van 
(R.II. 35, 43). Walt King went in the house with Mike to 
purchase the marijuana. (R.II. 36). Joan Davis then dropped the 
group off at Randy Bachman's house (R.II. 36). Mike never told 
his Mother why he wanted to go (R.II. 36). Further, Mike 
testified that the vehicle never stopped and there was no 
splitting or division of marijuana in the van (R.II. 36-37). The 
marijuana was divided after they got out of the van (R.II. 44). 
Mike stated that his mother had no knowledge whatsoever of the 
events that occurred while Mike and Walt King were in the 
apartment at Second East and 2800 South in Salt Lake City (R.II. 
38). Further, Mike Davis never smoked marijuana in front of his 
mother. (R.II. 47). 
Regardless of Prosecuting Attorney Skordas' statement that it is 
"Hard for me to believe that the mother didn't also know what was 
going on" (R.II. 88), the facts as given by Joan Davis, Mike 
Davis, and Kevin Canham support that Joan Davis did not know what 
was going on when she gave her son and his friends a ride on 
August 4, 1987. 
Even assuming the facts as reported by Officer Steven Olson, 
Joan Davis was not involved in the transportation of drugs for 
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present because she wanted to purchase marijuana. Neither Joan 
Davis nor the 1987 Dodge Caravan were present to assist in the 
distribution, transportation, or sale of marijuana and the 
judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
III. THERE IS A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE FORFEITED VEHICLE THAT 
PROHIBITS FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Annotated 58-37-13 (1953 as amended) governs 
forfeiture procedure and dictates what rights exist in the 
property subject to forfeiture and reads in part as follows: 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and 
no property right exists in them: . . . 
(e) All conveyances including aircraft, 
vehicle, or vessels used or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or 
concealment of property described in subsection (l)(a) 
or (l)(b), except that: 
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance 
subject to a Bona Fide Security Interest is subject to 
the interest of a secured party who could not have 
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would or did take place in the use of the 
conveyance. 
U.C.A. 58-37-13 (l)(e)(iii) (1987) (Emphasis added). 
In discussing third parties' rights under Utah's forfeiture 
statute, this Court has stated: 
Possible interests of others in the vehicle have been 
adequately protected by the legislature. . . . Any 
person claiming an interest in the vehicle can file a 
petition for release of his interest in the property. 
If the claimant has a valid interest that is not 
subject to forfeiture the Court shall order release of 
the property or partial release and forfeiture, in 
which case the property is sold and the proceeds 
distributed among legitimate claimants first. 
State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case the State would have the Court believe 
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that there is more required than what is set forth in the above 
mentioned statute. More specifically, something more than a bona 
fide security interest. However, the statute is clear in that 
the property subject to forfeiture is itself, all other elements 
satisfied, subject to the rights of a Bona Fide Security 
Interest. 
A Security Interest need not include a perfected security 
interest. These are two different terms under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The issue is whether the security interest 
under Utah's forfeiture statute is required to be perfected (R. 
82) . 
The statute in question does not require a perfected 
security interest. (Generally, see White & Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code, Section 22-3 at 965-73 (Third Edition 1988)). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has explained that Bona Fide means 
being in or with good faith, without fraud or deceit. Combined 
Metals Reduction Co. et al. v. State Tax Commission et al., 17 6 
P.2d 614 (Utah 1947) . 
This definition is still in harmony with the modern 
definition referenced in Blacks Law Dictionary (5th Edition 
1979): 
Bona Fide 
In or with good faith; honestly, openly and sincerely; 
without deceit or fraud; truly; actually; without 
simulation or pretense, innocently; in the attitude of 
trust and confidence; without notice of fraud etc. 
real, actual, genuine, and not feigned. 
Blacks Law Dictionary at 160 (5th ed. 1979). 
The court in First National Bank of Arizona v. Carbajal, 645 
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P.2d 778, 779 (Arizona 1982), defined what a security interest 
is, posing the question, " We must answer the following question 
on appeal: (1) To what extent does the noncompliance with 
Arizona's Motor Vehicle Registration Code affect the rights of 
the parties?" As part of the answer to the above question, the 
Supreme Court of Arizona stated "A Security Interest is no more 
than the right of a creditor to attach and perfect an interest in 
the property superior to the interest of any other." Ixi. at 783. 
Further, the court stated "For a party seeking to perfect a 
Security Interest in a motor vehicle, these provisions are 
mandatory and failure to comply with Motor Vehicle Code results 
in the parties having no right to enforce under that code." 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-13 does not require a 
perfected security interest as the State may have the Court 
believe. Nowhere does 58-37-13 reference compliance with the 
Motor Vehicle Code. 
To the contrary, 58-37-13 requires a Bona Fide Security 
Interest only. This provision of the Code allows anyone that 
claims an interest in the vehicle to petition the Court for a 
release of that interest. It does not require that a person have 
a perfected security interest pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code. 
This provision allows the Court the necessary latitude to 
review the interests of all parties to determine for itself 
whether or not each petitioning party has a legitimate, genuine, 
bona fide interest in the property in question. If the 
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legislature wanted the provision to be so cut and dried as the 
State has argued it would have been very simple to add a phrase 
that perfected interests pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act are 
required. 
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded in the Carbaial case 
that the automobile seller's retention of the title document was 
a Security Interest. This is exactly on point in the case at 
hand. Rosalee Hansen retained the duly executed title to the van 
as a security interest in the van. Gerald Davis and Rosalee 
Hansen both have bona fide security interests in the 1987 Dodge 
Caravan as contemplated in 58-37-13. Each should be allowed 
relief as provided for in 58-37-13. 
While it's true that the state did not have a specific lien 
against the vehicle for a loan, it is also true that the evidence 
is clear that money was borrowed for the purpose of purchasing 
this vehicle. 
Joan Davis' husband, Gerald, and Rosalee Hansen are the real 
victims in a forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van. Gerald Davis took 
a loan from Ms. Davis' sister, Rosalee Hansen, in the amount of 
$10,500 to purchase the van which cost approximately $15,500 (R. 
7, 57). The title to the van was notarized at Brighton Bank on 
3300 South in Salt Lake City (R. 8) and given to Rosalee Hansen 
as security on the $10,500 loan (R. 9). The title to the van was 
transferred to Rosalee Hansen on June 16th (R. 9). 
A security contract existed between Gerald Davis and Rosalee 
Hansen covering the purchase of the van (R. 35, 57). The total 
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amount of the loan was $10,500 (R. 36). The security agreement 
was written on May 9, 1987 (R. 36) and had terms of $250 month + 
05% interest (R. 57) (See Addendum C). In turn the title went 
with Rosalee Hansen (R. 58). Gerald Davis had made nine payments 
at the time Ms. Hansen testified (R. 37). Gerald Davis still 
owes $8,663.50 under the agreement (R. 38). Rosalee Hansen 
registered herself as a lienholder at the end of March 1988 (R. 
38). Ms. Hansen had no knowledge van was used to transport or 
distribute controlled substances. (R. 39). Further, Ms. Hansen 
thought the agreement was legal and binding. (R. 44). 
Mr. Gerald Davis observed Joan Davis sign the title at the 
bank. (R. 58). At the date of the hearing, Gerald Davis had paid 
$6,938 into the vehicle (R. 58). Mr. Davis wanted the plates in 
his wife's name and the title in both names (R. 59). Mr. Gerald 
Davis had no information that the vehicle was being used in 
transporting or possessing or distributing controlled substances 
(R. 60). Mr. Davis gave a check to Hinckley Dodge for 
$11,868.83. Two other checks for tax and license were written in 
the amounts of $650 and $42 (R. 62). Mr. Davis deposited $9,000 
of the $10,500 that he had obtained from Rosalee Hansen (R. 73) 
(Exhibits 9 and 10). Mr. Davis used the other $1,500 to buy a ton 
and a half truck (R. 73). 
Alan Tibbits, Vice-President of Brighton bank testified that 
he notarized the signature on the Certificate of Title (R. 81) 
(See Addendum E—Certificate of Title). Tibbits, at the time of 
the proceedings below had been the vice-president and manager of 
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Brighton Bank for 8 years (R.II. 27-28). Tibbits has been a 
notary for over 18 years (R.II. 29). Tibbits was aware that a 
sister or relative financed the van for Gerald Davis because 
Davis could finance the van at a better rate (R. 27-29). 
There is a difference between a security interest and a 
perfected security interest under Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (R. 
83). A bona fide security interest exists when you give someone 
$10,500. 58-37-13(9)(c) requires that notice be given to all 
parties known to have an interest on claim on the property. This 
requirement is not limited to listings at the Division of Motor 
Vehicles (R. 89). The $10,500 was a bona fide interest. Because 
of the interests of Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen the lower 
court's ruling should be reversed. 
IV. TESTIMONY GIVEN IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING MAY NOT RELY ON 
STATEMENTS TAKEN DURING CRIMINAL CUSTODY BEFORE A MIRANDA 
WARNING WAS ISSUED. 
Certain constitutional rules apply to civil as well as 
criminal forfeiture proceedings. See e.g., United States v. 
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722 (1971) (fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination cognizable at in 
rem forfeiture proceeding); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 
380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965) (exclusionary rule applied to civil 
forfeiture proceeding). 
Statements made while Joan Davis was in custody without a 
Miranda warning were admitted in this civil forfeiture proceeding 
over the objection of Davis' counsel (R.II. 49-50). Joan Davis 
told Officer McCarthy that the van was hers (R.II. 50). 
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A: THE WITNESS [Officer McCarthy]: I didn't ask 
her anything. Chuck Oliver asked her — made 
a comment, something to the effect, "That's a 
nice van." 
And the lady in custody, Ms. Davis, 
stated it was hers and it was paid for. 
Q: (By Mr. Skordas:) It was hers and it was 
paid for? 
A: Yes. Excuse me. "I own it. It's paid for," 
or, It's mine." Something — 
(R.II. 51). 
Officer William McCarthy who works with metro narcotics 
testified to these inconclusive statements which were made while 
Joan Davis was in custody without a Miranda warning. Testimony 
which is obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be 
relied on to sustain a forfeiture in a civil proceeding. 
Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. 693, 702. Judge Frederick relied on 
Joan Davis' statement in making his final ruling. Judge 
Frederick stated, "Joan Davis told the seizing officers McCarthy 
and Lewellyn that the vehicle was hers and that it was paid for." 
See Ruling at 4. 
Equitable considerations should also exclude Ms. Davis' 
testimony. Officer McCarthy never inquired whether there was a 
loan on the vehicle. For that matter he didn't ask any questions 
about the ownership (R.II. 51). Officer McCarthy works with 
Gerald Davis and knew that Davis had borrowed money from Davis' 
sister or sister-in-law (R.II. 52) However, McCarthy never 
inquired whether there was a loan on the vehicle. McCarthy 
didn't ask any further questions about the ownership of the van 
(R. 51). Officer McCarthy's memory of the statement is not even 
conclusive that Joan Davis stated that the vehicle was paid for. 
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For Joan Davis' statement to be admissible, the officer should 
have at least asked a complete set of rational and reasonable 
questions about the ownership of the van. Instead, the 
prosecution relies on one isolated statement to argue that Joan 
Davis owned the van. Appellant argues that neither McCarthy nor 
Joan Davis viewed the question or the answer as complete. 
Joan Davis' statement to officer McCarthy should not have 
been permitted. The statement made to Officer McCarthy was not 
conclusive. By McCarthy's own statement, he didn't fully 
question Ms. Davis regarding the ownership of the van or about 
any liens. Nevertheless, the state relies on Joan Davis' 
statement that she owned the van for proof of ownership. The 
district court erred in admitting this testimony and Appellant 
asks that this court reverse the lower court's ruling and remand 
this case for the forfeiture proceedings to be waived, a 
permissible holding under Plymouth/ 380 U.S. at 702. 
V. THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF THE 1987 DODGE CARAVAN 
INVALIDATES THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 reads in pertinent part: 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act 
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon 
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may be 
made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection under an 
administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a 
criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this 
act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to 
believe that the property has been used or intended to 
be used in violation of this act. . . . 
Evidence established at the forfeiture proceeding 
established that no warrant was issued for forfeiture of the 1987 
Dodge Van (R.II. 54 and Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Joan 
Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14). Seizure of a vehicle 
can only be "upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property." Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13 (1988 cum. supp.) 
(empha s i s added). 
Officer William McCarthy was not aware of any warrant to 
seize the vehicle. (R.II. 54). The grounds for taking the 
vehicle was that it's common procedure. (R.II. 55). This State 
action violated Joan Davis' fourth amendment rights and is in 
further violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13. 
United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370 (3d Cir. 1981) 
recognized that the forfeiture exception to warrant requirement 
for seizures governed by the fourth amendment. In United States 
v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit 
read the probable cause exception to requiring a warrant for a 
seizure: 
as justifying the warrantless seizure of an automobile 
only when the seizure immediately follows the 
occurrence that gives the federal agents probable cause 
to believe that the automobile is subject to forfeiture 
under section 881(a) and the exigencies of the 
surrounding circumstances make the requirement of 
obtaining process unreasonable or unnecessary. 
Id. (involved the issue of suppression of evidence after a 
warrantless seizure 11 months after the facts giving rise to 
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probable cause). 
In United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1472 (9th Cir. 
1983), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the principle that a 
"warrantless seizure of a parked car is lawful under the 
automobile exception only where specific exigent circumstances 
justify an immediate seizure." Spetz allows for warrantless 
seizure of automobiles when two factors are present, "probable 
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband, and 
. . . exigent circumstances associated with the automobile." Id. 
n. 28 (citation omitted). 
Neither of the two key factors is present here. The 
officers that seized the vehicle had probable cause to believe 
that the Dodge Van had been used in the past to transport a 
quarter ounce of marijuana, but when the vehicle was seized while 
parked in the Davis' driveway over five months after it was 
allegedly used in the "transportation" for purposes of 
distribution, the officers had no reason to believe that the 
vehicle contained contraband. Additionally, there were no 
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of the 
vehicle. The facts leading to the seizure of the 1987 Dodge Van 
occurred on August 4, 1987. The seizure of the van took place 
over five months later on January 19, 1988. 
Although it is unclear whether dismissal of a forfeiture 
action is the specific remedy when property subject to forfeiture 
has been illegally seized, Application of Kinqsley, 802 F.2d 571, 
578 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Immigration and Naturalization 
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Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)) (Plymouth Sedan, 
380 U.S. at 702 states that a court may exercise discretion in 
waiving a forfeiture), should this Court determine that dismissal 
is improper, the property (or its approximate value since the van 
has already been sold) should be returned to its proper owners 
until proceedings may be held consistent with the arguments in 
this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant, Joan 
Davis, respectfully requests that this Court reverse the opinion 
of the lower court allowing for forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van 
and remand the case to the district court for either dismissal 
with return of the van (or its proximate value) or a new hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this ,21 day of March, 1989. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Counsel, let me first express my appreci-
ation for your willingness to come over here and listen to 
this ruling. I had anticipated giving a little more notice 
than what I've given you* However, I am presently in Tooele 
County and have to go back shortly, so I thought I would rule 
while I am ready. 
Let me say this is the time set at the Court's request 
for ruling in the matter of Joan E. Davis et al versus the 
State of Utah, case number C-88-655. Counsel who tried the 
case are present before the Court. 
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter on the 
8th of April, this Court took under advisement its ruling to 
examine the authorities presented by counsel, to further 
examine the exhibits that have been received, and is now 
prepared to rule. 
Title 58-37-13 sub.1(e) provides, inter alia, for the 
forfeiture of conveyances used to transport or facilitate 
the sale of controlled substances, except vehicles used for 
illegal purposes not known to be so used or consented to be 
so used by the owner, or vehicles subject to, guote, bona 
fide occttrxty interest, end quote* 
The state in this case argues that the term bona fide 
security interest is synonymous with perfected security 
interest and therefore, unless the provisions of the Motor 
.1 WCIULJ. «, '",,."1, ixl J. II I 1 -I , L H . ul Ith- Utah Code are 
2 complied wit,tn , lienholder or encumbrancer tusb r.c enforceable 
3 infprer r nqninsf fhf1 '.* "" • > . 
4 This Coux I is not persuaded that the pertinent 
•5 provisions of tVj Utah Controlled Substances Act 58-31-1 and 
6 I i „i I J o w in i j i in i in i I s p e c l i l e a l I y Lib I ' I I ullli, "• H t j i i i s o r e q u i r e s . 
7 Indeed, 3t is f hi G Court ' t- view Hint hatl I he Legislature 
8 i in t r j n d i-ii I 1  11 i-i 1 11 in in II i, I'H11 r J t j r II p e l s c i ' i u n i l
 i " i n t i I HJ :J I «• hi n i l • 1 <-J i I l u i i c i 
H "'• .=--i.- -. • r„— . efcrrec * reciiiCdiiv 
... i.Tian; - a"0 standing 
dim cha l l enge s e i z u r e , even tiiouqn t h e i r a l l e g e d i n t e r e s t s 
( i I , I I H 11 p p r ( > r f , M i | , 11- | |-( | , 111 I i i I I mi | \ j i }pf} | ,L 11, f\ | I- # 
This Couri is persuaded by a preponderance ot the 
evidence, however, that Joan Davis knew and part ic ipat PI I in 
l IK- U^L* ui tin:1 vtlncle m question for the illegal purpos*. 
of facilitating a sale of controlled substances. This Court 
1 8 I v I P « 1 I 11 lii P • i ' II il I  1 il I  i l l f t i ( P J I I i ' " I  J i';i t ; 11 ira; IIIIIIH i t ; i n t r i j i I i I f 
Mliuiiii III l e s t i m o n y ol Ms Joan Davis and a c c o r d i n g l y , 
II* I 1 . " prong of the t e s + : i s met t h a i be inn t he .« »; of 
1
 ' •, •' e y d r i c i .i i, i\ J e s 11 o n t o i 111 e t r a n s p o r t a n d / o i f a c i 1 , • 
22 [ t a t i o n of trie n a l e of c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s . 
ii"11 ; The r e f oi, f • I h i a C o n i: I; d e t e r in j ir m e a I  l;i a I 11 in v s e 1 1 u r t" i > i i. 
24 |proper "'and'•'unless one or, both of the pertinent exceptions 
:25 -above- i ef erred to pertain, namely, subdivision 1,1- II11 I i : 
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iii under 58-37f the petition will be denied. Specifically, 
the issue is whether claimants Gerald Davis or his wife Joan 
Davis was the owner of the vehicle in question and whether 
or not the claimant Rosalee Hanson possessed a bona fide 
security interest precluding forfeiture, at least to the 
extent of hers, Rosalee Hansen's, claimed interests. 
The testimony of the petitioners in this case, in this 
Court's judgment, was not credible in certain critical 
particulars. Joan Davis completed the application for the 
certificate of title and the issued title was in her name 
alone listing no lienholders. Gerald Davis stated in his 
testimony that he knew that the vehicle was titled only in 
his wife's name when the title was received on or about 
June thr* 16th of 1987. However, he testified in his affidavit^ 
before this Court, Exhibit 8, that he didn't know until the 
vehicle was seized January the 19th of 1988 that it was 
titled in the wife's name alone. 
Joan Davis told the seizing officers McCarthy and 
Lewellyn that the vehicle was hers and that-it was paid for. 
Yet she testified in court at trial that the vehicle belonged 
to her husband and that there were sums owed t>ir*the vehicle. 
fcerald Davis DW the 20tW of SnnwBKY&c£ ISB8, the £ay 
after the seizure ajud some eight jnoofctis SBtiSSBEfche, alleged 
date*of the so-called Security agreement, EkhlDIt 4, told 
Lieutenant Vuyk that there was no written security agreement 
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6 
and tnrtl" "rrr mre ill 1 ,i| I Lie paymen I "s 1 Hanson on the alleged 
loan were in each,, evidenced by no cancelled checks. Y ^ 
Gerald Davis had ah active checking arrouriL t. i i he- \-r 
qnes iioji in il in 11-. Court was provided with no purchase agreement 
from Hinckley Dodge for the vehicle The security aqreement, 
F , ill • in i" i it , 1 i ii question • 
7
 ,Tne transaction failed to comply with Title 4 1-1 - 2 C aub.L, 
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4 1 . ^ . 3 7 ^ 4 2 _ 2 . g 2
 a n o f \-\lr h iM 1 M I M in in in in i n i i M . 
Rosalee Hanson testified that she obtained $9 700 in 
c:as h or in a cashier's che<;:k f or a diamond ring she so I rI » 
i,;i i "['F»ecj"ij '•' ii H I " . 1 ' I i i J i J I;, i '"»»." t"','" her residence to lorik at 
her car, She? wc-nt vjth Mx , Morris, iii'icl :ashed the check and 
h e l d t h e S"""1',, 7 0 0 in r 11 '•. il" i il" i a p p r 'i jiririto I! y o m : iiin I ii II, ,i I I! 
weeks before giving it to her brother-in-law for an invest; 
ment which was to pay her five percent interest, withnut 
g e 11 i" i«|, , i i a L ',;,J I j •', lu ,i t, l"i v. •:  a s h c r r u n n I n g t h e c a s h 1 h r o u g h 
one of the three accounts that she maintained at the time. 
The s e n i n t y aq n:M.»iiii'ii t" ii:. i qin i f i i.viiit "II i" 1inn II hi i s i on i I  
v i e w , p r e s u m a b l y w i i t t e n on o r abou t t h e d a t e t h e cash was 
g i v e n , I I ' I I M ' S t o t he p a s t t e n s e " a g r e e d . " lixai *. 
, .,y.i' "L'. , .,". j . . - J! !"! ! luet ic; liO loan t h e 'sums* 
furthermore, t he so-ca l led seciix i ant se t s the 
amount of the lei a in mi , I: S I( I I: I )( I I IllIU b a n k 6 t 11 I ihibit 
101 produced by Mi Gerald Davis shows s SSJIDOO transfex fr om 
iGerald Davi&'s .savings account where Rosalee •ay.money was 
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supposedly deposited to the checking account toa May1 the ilth 
of 1987. 
A casual observation of the foregoing <litany of events 
would reflect, I'm sure, -to the most bbjective observer that 
there aire too many loose ends and unexplained circumstances, 
Mr. Larsen, to-determine that the petitioner's story is 
persuasive. 
It is therefore this Court's judgment that the 
transaction between the Davises and Hanson appears to be less 
than bona fide. This Court is not persuaded that either of 
the two exceptions in Title 58-37-13 pertain. Accordingly, 
it is this Court's view that the petition seeking to stay 
the forfeiture should be and is denied. 
Mr. Skordas or Ms. Barbiero, I will ask that you please 
prepare Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in accordance with what is stated here. 
However, let me further indicate that I have touched 
upon what I view to be highlights in the testimony and the 
statement of the discrepancies in the testimiony is by no 
^eans intended to be all-inclusive. 
Submit the Findinqs, Conclusions and Judoment to Mr. 
Larsen for his approval as to form before submitting 
23 tthem to the Court* 
courvsel, are tttfcre any questions in thi* matter? 
MR. LARSEN: "Hour Honor, may we ask for a stay upon the 
e x e c u t i o n of tho o r d e r fo r 30 d a y s , p e n d i n g p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
r i g h t t o appenI 
THE COUH'i • Counsel my n o t i o n would be t h a t c e r t a i n l y 
i .",,11, i it nt1 t ' ' t i m e l y f i l e t h e i r a o o e a l . i ' ln 
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r a t h e r , howewi uf the view t h a t t h e i r p r o c e d u r e \o e f f e c t 
a sLd.i a i d b t 1 P p«i*-fr
 lf, s u p e r s e d e a s bond, I would expec t 
111 c o u n s e l can fn.ll a g i e t * upm i |n u i e J u n 1 I M l ! " 
t o a l l o w t h a t a p p e a l to gn f o r w a r d , t h e n c o n t a c t me and we"11 
1
 jpf ii i mi in i • i in in i . 
Mii1, LARSLNi How d id you ^ i ew Mr T i b b i t s 1 t e s t i m o n y , 
I'oux Honor r e o a r d inq t h e n o t a r i z a t i o n nf t h a t ? 
T H E C O U R ' I H i I I I iJ J i l i i i I I I II III II i 1 L i I 1 i b " t i ' i i, 
to be Jn thn least suspect, but neither did 1 find that it 
u J I c .
 t i * I i * i " " i J « i i " | ' < , P • > > r-- T f -' * • i y 
Mr, T i t b i t s 1 c r e d i b i l i t y , I I h inL , was p r o b a b l y above 
TPnro 0 hi [nit ii d i d n ' t x e a l l y SOPHI t i me to e i t h e i s u p p o r t 
o i d e t r a c t from the t h e o r y o i uit« t t a t c t h a t Liu c t l o i M 
t o e s t a b l i s h a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t we ie a f t e r 1 hi f i ! r a t h e x 
t f l d H I n II i II I I 111 II 11 II 
There's no doubi thmf the parties here intended to 
purchase a vrhirlr parly on cu^ u xn tact ~^u pur^^ l 
vehicle* The critical issue- however, is "Whe 
thaifc Vehicle **is 1® feet owned by or titled to Joan Da\ is, a 
opposed I:: ;:: • Gerald,'" axftl number two whPthPi m inn t In isa 1 PIP 
Hanson had a,, bona fide security interest in the vehicle, 
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neither of which issued in my^udgment-, did Tibbits' 
testimony bear upon* 
MR. LARSEN: ^banx you. 
THE COURT: All right, counsels I might say that 
this has been a difficult case for me to rule on. I mean, 
it is very close and that is partly a product, I'm sure, of 
the fact that counsel on both sides of the issue presented it 
very clearly and forcibly, so you're to be commended on your 
presentation, but someone has to rule and that falls on me. 
MR. SKORDAS: Your Honor, with respect to the judgment 
in this matter, I suppose the state could take the judgment 
one step further then to deny the petitioner's motion or 
petition to set aside the forfeiture and to grant the state 
its forfeiture here. 
THE COURT: Well, yes. The effect of my ruling, of 
course is to deny the petition to stay the forfeiture or to 
avoid the forfeiture, which obviously means that the state 
is entitled to proceed with the forfeiture subject, 
however to any stay that might be imposed pursuant to the 
petitioner's taking an appeal on this ruling. 
MR. SKORDAS: What I'm worried abourt I ouess. is 
-the stare now having to fi&e a Deti'ilon fax m forfeiture and 
having a trfal on the matter, 
THE COURT: No. Forfeiture *•« arantedw That's the 
ruling. That's the procedure I'm following. 
1 MR. SKORDAS: I tliui.iy.hl Llidl was I Im case, 
2 Thank you 
4I THE COURT: Thank you. Court will be in recess 
4 J (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH *) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No. 
220, and one of the official court reporters of the State of 
Utah; that on the 12th day of April, 1988, I attended the 
within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had 
thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings to 
be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 2 to 9, inclusive, constitute a full, true and 
correct account of the same, to the best of my ability. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 19th day of 
April, 1988. 
C
~V<-A^ 
ANNA M. BENNETT. CSR 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 58-37-13 
•n authorized r \ d\* administrative lnspecti^. w a n - -; law 
enii • o-Tii(»nt officer or ^np luwe designated in Secnm. -Vv.O * ha.- the 
l ight: 
(i) To inspect and copy records required by this act. 
(ii) To inspect within reasonable limits and a reasonable manner, 
the controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and 
unfinished material, containers, and labeling found, and except as 
provided in Subsection (3)(e), all other things including records, files, 
papers, processes, controls, and facilities subject to regulation and 
control by this act or by rules promulgated by the department. 
(iii) To inventory and stock of any controlled substance and obtain 
samples of any substance 
(d) This section shall not be construed to prevent the inspection of 
books and records without a warrant pursuant to an administrative sub-
poena issued by a court or the department nor shall it be construed to 
prevent entries and administrative inspections including seizures of prop-
erty without a warrant: 
(i) With the consent 01 Kit .»\\ia;r, operator, or agent in charge of 
the controlled premises; 
(ii) In situations presenting imminent danger to health or safety; 
(iii) In situations involving inspection of conveyances where there 
is reasonable cause to believe that the mobility of the conveyance 
makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant; 
(iv) In any other exceptional or emergency a 
time or opportunity to apply for a warrant is h. 
(v) In all other situations where a warrant is n > constitutionally 
required. 
(e) No inspection authorized by this section shall extend to financial 
data, sales data, other than shipment data, or pricing data unless the 
owner, operator, or agent in charge of the controlled premises consents in 
writing. 
History: L. 19* -• t • r*- - r:i*-rii corrected ihe statutory refeivr,. *- .j *ijh-
92, § 101. sreti.".:, ' >,• • !i.„.;.- rr,H. -r st\ !:«ti chav,^>. 
Amendment Notes. 1 hi- 1987 am«.i»d-
58-37-1 , M„y<t* « r n . 
c e d u r e . 
»] The foil ovum* are suhjeci * . - >nd ~. ;>r wi -** 
then 
Ml t , J t M l ^ i - I A l -T- U f t - 1 - 11 1CI 111. 
uted, di?t •. oi acqu . •*•* •: of this act, 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or 
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not in-
cluding capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or 
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this 
act; 
58-37-13 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or in-
tended for use, to-tTanspoftToniTany manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described 
in Subsections (l)(a) or (l)(b), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in 
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation 
of this act; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security 
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation 
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instru-
ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any viola-
tion of this act; but: 
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and 
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable 
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is 
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act; and 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of 
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that a violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the 
194 
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property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the 
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at 
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experi-
enced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to estab-
lish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace 
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction-over 
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant 
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judg-
ment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding 
under this act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsec-
tion (4) shall be instituted promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When prop-
erty is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant 
under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate loca-
tion for disposition in accordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, dis-
tributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances 
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state 
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are 
unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I 
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this 
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, 
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any 
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof 
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court 
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request 
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the 
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of 
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the 
195 
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case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency 
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may 
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defen-
dant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, 
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the 
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the direc-
tor of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the 
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications 
for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing agency 
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and ad-
visability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant 
or seizing agency, where no application is made, who may obtain the 
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The 
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or 
agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to ex-
ceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. 
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing 
agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection 
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the 
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction. 
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the 
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of 
the department or his designated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture 
to the state shall be made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the 
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed 
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable partic-
ularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forth-
with issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject 
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the 
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection 
58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all 
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by 
one of the following methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the 
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right, 
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by 
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mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to4he 
address given upon the records of the division, which service is 
deemed complete even though the mail is refined or ftgnnnt hf for, 
warded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but 
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publica-
tion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the 
seizure was made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party 
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or 
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under 
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his 
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest 
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served 
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer 
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of 
forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, 
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court 
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the prop-
erty as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an 
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition 
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall 
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the 
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights 
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The 
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the 
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceed-
ings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state, 
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the 
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited 
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The 
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture 
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, 
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, stor-
age of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, 
and costs of sale; and 
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(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. •» 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in 
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiiauX4U£C&ttU 
ing, including seizure and storage of the propertjL^against the individual 
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may 
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as 
appropriate. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 13; 1982, ch. 
12, ft 2; 1982, ch. 32, 5 9; 1987, ch. 87, ft 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ANALYSIS 
Forfeiture of vehicle. 
Grounds for denial. 
—Not found. 
Forfeiture of vehicle. 
Forfeiture of defendant's motorcycle was not 
unduly harsh considering the value of the mo-
torcycle versus the amount of contraband 
drugs, where the evidence demonstrated con-
cealment and/or transportation with an intent 
to distribute. State v. One 1982 Silver Honda 
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Grounds for denial. 
—Not found. 
The court's denial of a petition by the state 
for forfeiture of a vehicle — based on a combi-
nation of four factors: (1) The case was not set 
for hearing within 20 days of the filing of an 
answer to the petition, as directed by Subsec-
tion (9)(g); (2) the lack of indication of profit 
motive in the transactions and small amounts 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — For 
comment, "Whose Right to Counsel Is It?,w see 
13 J. Contemp. L. 161 (1987). 
58-37-17. Judicial review. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 17; 1987, ch. 
161, * 203. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1987, rewrote this sec-
tion to the extent that a detailed analysis is 
impracticable. 
of drugs involved; (3) the question of possible 
equitable interests in the vehicle by other par-
ties; and (4) the value of the vehicle forfeited 
appeared to be disproportionate to the use that 
was made of the vehicle — was error, for the 
following reasons: The delay in no way preju-
diced the rights of the parties involved; this 
section does not require a showing of a profit 
motive on the part of the person involved in the 
transportation and distribution of drugs; a ve-
hicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how 
small the quantity of contraband found; this 
section clearly provides a method for satisfac-
tion of the claims upon forfeiture of a vehicle; 
and the value of the property seized is immate-
rial. State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338 
(Utah 1986). 
ment, effective January 1, 1988, so rewrote 
this section as to make a detailed analysis im-
practicable. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final order may obtain judicial 
review. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the 
district court of Salt Lake County. 
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ADDENDUM D: Information, Warrant, and Police Report 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
County Attorney 
GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Phone: (8011 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 1 Screened by: G. Skordas 
Assigned to: Drug Team 
Plaintiff, ) 
BAIL $1,500.00 
v. ) 
INFORMATION 
JOAN DAVIS DOB 02/29/49, 1 
Criminal No. 
) 
Defendant(s1. 
The undersigned S. Olson - Metro Narcotics under oath states 
on information an: belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNT 1 
UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION, OFFERING, AGREEING, CONSENTING OR ARRANGING 
TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED OR COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE, a Third Degree 
Felony, at 2850 South 215 Fast, in Salt Lake Countv. State 
of Utah, on or about August -8,-JL33 4. in violation cf Title 
£!_. Charter 3", Section 8f 11 {a V i i ) . Utah Code ir.notat*'' 
jy?), as snen.iel", in that the defendant. JOAN DAVIS, a partv 
:; the offense, did knowingly an-i intent ional V-* fistri>>jt*. 
offer, fei-rcc-. consent or aTrance T O distribute a control". *H 
or co'.Ji:t «-rf e? T substance, tc-vit: Mariiuana. a Controlled 
S-JV<.*. P.-A*O : 
THIS INFORMATION !S BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
KITNF.SSES: 
5. Olson c. ?% q u e u e *'. Ho^son la'vid S. Murdock 
(Continued on page Two") 
INFORMATION1 
STATE v. -THAN DAVIS 
County Attorney #88-1-74369/01 
Page Two 
PROBABLE CA.USE STATEMENT: 
Count I: 
On August 8, 1987 at approximately 2130 hours at 2850 South 
215 East, in Salt Lake County, affiant purchased from the defendant 
for $35.00 in cash a substance which has been analyzed and found to 
be marijuana. 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this day of January, 1988. 
Judge 
Authorized for presentment and 
filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney 
A far Ind*" , Deputy 
surf/261 2 c 
88-1-7436901 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Eleanor VanSciver 
Before 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN DAVIS vsD0B 0 2 / 2 9 / 4 9 
Judge of the Circuit Court 
Warrant of Arrest 
Criminal No 
Defendant(s) 
(Address DOB) 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
To am Peace Officer in the State of Utah. Greeting 
An\ Information, upon oath. ha\inc been this dav made before me b\ 
S." Olson - Metro Ware #87-63185 
ana it appears from the iniormauon or affidau: 
Hied uith the information, that there is probable cause to beliexe that the public offerse oi 
D i s t . C/S , 3° 
has been commired and that 
3o3n P a v : s 
- ha* : -rr.itteo u 
^01 ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the ano\t-n«ned oefencai^jon^unt- c r-np the 
a tncc^,, r>e or? -*vs Cw.n or be*w-e:ne nearer or mos: accessible magistrate for setting ban Ifthece s- z&— r***> Dec 
justice. >ou snaH pursue the defenoant into an> other count\ of this state and tnere arrest tne oeieno*nt 1 ne C ourt fino> 
reasonable grounos to bei»c\e defendant will not appear upon a summons 
Ban » m in the amount of $ $ 1 » S 0 0 . 0 0 . 
Dated thir
 w da> of January . A D 19 8 8 
This uarrant max be served da\ or mgm 
Circuit Judge 
ETKO NARC./FELOHY 
FIELD NOTES 
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SR 
»*C CODE JPRiMARY U f f t * » t - i 
ttteO \J>LSrC/S-M(M£. 
JNOCCOOE 
LASSIFICABON CHANGE 
YES ftp NO f j 
FELONY? 
vttfyr KOi j 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
SECONDARY OtHHSt (DATE REPORTED 
OCCURRED: 
DATT-jfrfTW 2Jio *K,T7jt:<\A#>tc>£ ZKGtSo. ZIS~£ 
ADDUSS Of OCCURRENCE 
CASE NUU6ER 
Z4t* lg?63/g|r 
VEHICLE REPORT-VC 
DDRESS Of RECOVERED STOUN VEHICU 
WNER (LAST. FIRST) [ADDRESS 
JFIDAVTT FILED? 
f S l I NOC I 
IMPOUNDED? 
YES < > NO f I 
(REASON FOR IMPOUND HEIDPOR 
RESIDENCE PHONE 
CLAIM CHECK HiMBBk 
NO PHONE 
DECKER COMPANY WHtHt IMPOUNDED. OTY O 2160 W. 600 SO. 
D STATE 
O OTHER 
VEHICLE CONDITION 
O GOOD O POOR 
C FAIR 
GNmON LOCKED? 
ES ( ) N O ( ) 
KEYS IN IGNITION? 
YES I ) NO I I 
[WINDOWS LOCKED? 
YES ( ) NO I ) 
DOORS LOCKED? 
YES { | NO| > 
PROPERLY PARKED? 
YES ( 4 NO ( ) 
SCENE PROCESSED? 
YES! ) * 0 < I 
VEHICLE FIELD - 1 0 
'SASON {COLOR »1 
£uS08*r \ Be+J 
J C Y K fcJC. STATE 
%t ucn i 
4CdLOM«2 YEAR 1MAKE . _• 
yy} ft WL^-
VIN NUMBER 
MOOEL JBODY STYLE 
UNUSUAL FEATURES/DAMAGE 
LICENSE NJMBEft 
V/TJ towr 
TJFIELD -
CCTUblTtQrJ 
COMPLAINAN  I  $C 
CCMPkAJNANT IS ALSO: 
:^r -•• •» 
DO NOT f i l l IN BV. SP «r 9W. IF SOXES MARKED YES 
VICTIM ( | WITNESS ( ) PERSON LAST SECURING « } 
KAME ILAST. FIRST) 
£ &tec^~ Q^ ' 
ADDRESS 
staph -MEr&o 
RESIDENCE PHONE JNO PHONE BUSINESS PHONE SEX RACE lAGE.iOOe HP' / / CAN IDENTIFY? YES ( I NO < I 
WITNESS .K)RM? 
YESt J NO I I 
^ 
[SAME (LAST. FIRST) 
RESIOENCE PHONE 
I 
N O P H O N E BUSINESS PHONE 
VICTIM FIELD - 9V 
ADDRESS 
pEX 
_L_ 
RACE AGE DOB 
7 / ' 
CAN IDENTIFY* J 
YES 1 1 NO t | } 
jap 1 
WITNESS FORM? | 
YESI 1 N O I j j 
f\AME (LAST. FIRST) 
IR£.SJ0ENCTW0NE 1N0 PHONF" 
•••-« , ? M 
BUSINESS PHONE 
WITNESS FIELD - 9W 
ADORESS . , : -- * -... 
SEX RACE .
 ui AOE 
** * 
1 " V " 
DOB 
. 7* / ~ 
ICANlOEMTVr? WITNESS *OAMT j 
wiiT ~iT »'• • '• — M 
x>w /SCHOOL txsnocT 
HER *AST. FIRST) 
PARENT* NOTIFIED* 
YES 
< 1F£I» lUATE A N D W E NDWEO . ^ • ^RELEASEDIO __ — v . - . ^ . ^JREFEP-RED 1 0 T T T 
i * * - • • • • • • » • • * . " « - - . « • 
ADDRESS* ^ .— .-i » • * ' . ^ DP 
'I * • • 5• . . IT « _»* 
5a 
RESIDENCE PHONE NO PHONE 4 
EK OR GUARDIAN (LAST. FIRST) ADDRESS RESIDENCE PHONE NO PHONE 
I CHILD UVE WITH PARENTS? 
YES ( \ NO I I 
NAME Of PERSON IVfTH WHOM CKILT UVES (LAST, FIRST) 
TTTY ARTICLE 
L NUMBER ID MARKS 
TRADENAME 
DESCRIPTION 
PROPERTY FIELD-11 
• - • » * 
£ NUMBER 
.•% ' . , . • • • • * 
-
REASON I VALUE COLOR,. i^TJ 
' • » • . % .". * - -^ : 
CAN IDENTIFY? . *1 
Ygsf i i ioi :>( 
nn ARTICLE 
. NUMBER ID MARKS 
TRADENAME 
1 * " . - • - • • • " . # ! 
©NUMBER REASON VALUE COLOR T ^ l 
DESCRIPTION 
.'.% - - w i • * • • ; . • - .- .* ^ - r r • • * * . * r 
|CANKiniFY?'~r 
YES« 1 NOf tf 
DETAttS OF INVESTIGATION > RC • J » ^ 
ANT *L$P0Ht>£01 YES ( I NO & T NAME j fcpi j> . ^ . 
£> tveA/T 7D /rftze dtei/d je£tiz>&u&. /^fo 6yea6*ro*\ 
tf//te 7&ZJ7 J&k 7Q t**££r- ///0t &^ /£*rtxfr 
m+&/2. </£ 7f&&. 
•»?>.">•::•< 
hrf Ifewe^/^ v* ^ 
r. UJ&rtT- 7D &A/4 CM4£ J^^ 
OFFICER INFORMATION FIELD - 27/RR 
ASST. OFFICER © « ^ V , JON 
; * 
REPORTING OFFiCSR U M l . OfflCER 10*/WV. SSfWZin5J7B!v7 
r.*\ 
CLEARANOE. CMECJC* APPUCAftU JABIOROUP- CHEOC IF APPLICABLE ICOMPUTER ENTRY . I0» TATUS CHECK ONE 
M E T R O H A R C O S 
ICASE NUMBER 
SALT LAKE CITY L ^ (»a>t 
CONTINUATION' REPORT 
2 
'2>/ZCn/£ STA/ro /?W /fr?r. dOvtf/>£JFJT 
#r J/>J**0*: 2f66Sr> Zdgg." > ^ ^ A^O UJOt^^BA^r -7rt 
&J£ tr* -ru^ /fart. Jgtf MM &11/AA) "/tf/A^ZSP-
-7D"/to*><>H4f€. /foz~. /7ff££ tVAi? rz> f>#*f /%6 7 f g -
\ROAZ, /M^TT^ 7 7 ^ & U^ 
/ / ^ / &&T7J.&SBf) /^/=>*>C £*/*#&. /**&£.; CQ17& 
JL btfrj J>Jt£>t/£ US -7Z> 4 Ou£L& <4~7~ Y&W2& ZfSDg*. IftZ 
WP/&&XL: *>/££S~ 
?£fL 
StfZ. ' S&ZA/J&O <5AT£ 0P- 7ZS& />/£££ JW7D ^fa. RA*r. 
\&jje&/>£tf 73*£ &YZ*&eL <&/f7D 4 0f&2£l C^ &&*&£. 
'&' /2£77ArA/&1 77/£ &f&y &t£ <&=*>7- 72/£ /&&&£ -
{:£& MAT* &J?M>P&? &&LZ. <&*-&r~ <&W4i/I CZZZJ&LUL 
'Ifato?*>7M>JL' J4//£p>"rrp Ms jeesM&cae. 
4501 SOUTHWO^ .VEST, *223 - SALT LAK»IT\ JTAH 84119 
Phone (801)965-4487 
t*me (Last Frsl. Middle) 
AVIS, Joan 
am* (Usl.FtfSt. Middle) 
a m (Lest First, Middle) 
quesbng Analysis 
Olson 
na (Last, First. Middle f 
Requesting Agency a Address 
Sali Lake Metro 
elusion of tha eneiysit tha evidence will be: 
(ed up by agency Q MauL to agency 
aquestad and Special inttmctiom 
>prox. 1/8 o*. marijuana a Fmgerprints 
D.OB. 
D.OB. 
D.OB. 
D Other 
r~| HandwrtUr^  
(Filed out by laboratory) 
Laboratory No. 8 7 * 2 6 3 5 
J Agency pass Number 
67-631BS 
Typtof Rtporl 
Dist. c/s f/v 
j Date I Tan* ot Occurranc* 
08/04/87 2130 hrs. 
Agency Phone » 
35-7252 
Date ft Tme ot Roquoct 
D Other 
gr^^^^^^Bi 
jsigr|£ is prepared
 t o testify that |^ is employed by the <$jtf^"^\%g**u and that he did on the 
j^ ^ , 19 ob)Btr> from
 % _ 
of: L J Evidence as per property Invoice L J Other 
13th d^y , 
trident 
id make 8n examination and analysis of this evidence and in his opinion: 
e plastic b*g was found to contain 3.3 grams ot crashed marijuana. 
elusion of theapety^g
 t h f evidence on the / ^ w v day of 
O R t l * m d to Q Mailed to 
Analyst 
# 4 * ~ 
19 2£ 
£jj»^JS*j*i#-jk*<4**Maj&irt7 
ADDENDUM E: Certificate of Title 
&s *JTAH«CE€RTI FJGftTE^WJTLf* 
. >,;- « • . • *SEE REVERSE SIDE f OR INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION) •• - ' f - { ^ v *Y/.' 
lfftF*M * 'wis xurnras THAT :THI t* *SON WARHD tnow, A S W N I * , HAS ittHtwtY^ioiSTttkD,w fvVJg)* 'J.'J 
t
k
 \V- * ] # i • * * TMr OfFlCI Of TMI UTAH STATK TAX COMMISSION AHC THAT AMPLICATION # 0 * t t ftTPICATE . I J *> ;T ( \ - ' 
anr-siATt-ziBiC 
***£ss~ 1 * 0 - ^ - ' C B B C S O i r T r i r . : 
4 ^ #/J ^ : , > - : «RST UEN-HOIDER ttCHON
 ; ~ r - ...: * - I ^ . - r jcwgr 
^•• / f l ;^ot tss % - , / . f . : - ; i t . : — . ^ i f . i ^ r u i i v - E L ' O O i ' v - f - - 4 , . , , . . , ^ ^ - W ^ j f T * :-«-.«;r:v.Mt* '.i-.'.s-i:*.?*:. j ; ; *v^>-. - ' - ; - H4 . 
arY-5TATi-i f^**:. f f- 'ni r• * t i r < » - * • r ^ ^ > . - «• - ^ : • ••?•••' r 
^ ^ ^ ; . ^ T T J « W D E N M U M ^ 
' ^. i -. —t ? f !4 - > t - r : * - 1 1 1 • * *—,f ^ ! ; 
:^-^^ • ;^ -
- i t ; : * . - n f * < . - j M - V , r { 
;_ ' jKt^n in *$ec*»on 6 iw^evridv, -aid >j^rwnf,1^( trtic to be M e brri ^por p ' 
-
 rma^ be4n fg^or «• .fee p^non jhoi*m b| f j ^ Xm HakUr, Section 9 Sw»unci»c_ 
' ^ any.fip» W •r^utnbrcnUs «^ajwp<pv^^4»f P ^  / ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ' 
1
 ~iit^ifdl ^"fr**^ f. -1 »•. • 
-8JBS3BE{> ANDT^Othi 1^4 
V?- •• ^.nNEW.ilEN^IOLDERiEC 
wit 
^ ' ^ ^ V HtWOWMtRS SECTION ^7 •— ^U <TT 
^ri, -n r *>-• •»—*> - * r -^ - ^^ fit^--nr fix * - ^ r f ^ **z i 3fL? * *r " ^-" * r r~ - n r ** - e**z*~ n r iv^ •» r * ^  *• r H^&V 
" * *^  % * ; '?1 !t«l$^tRTlFICAIf IS €Yfc>CNCf Of OWHfMHIF.iWMlW THE VENfCU« S6iD CR • r t l i ^ ^ « W ; 
^ trfR*NSFE»RfDP^TM» -•4STRUMfNTr. I>«0*£*LY. €HDORSQ>, ^KIUST r » T raiSCNT|D * t»0 j f l l -
«TATE TOK ^OOMMfSSOH^HAOTOt 3 ViHICU OfVISlON ? OEKHK • TltANSFI^ CAM U MADL r 
ALTERATIONS, ERASURES OR OBLITERATIONS VOID THIS CERTIFICATE ^ S * » ' 
ADDENDUM F: Transcript of Mike Davis' 
Preliminary Hearing—Testimony of Officer Steve Olson. 
STATE vs. Mike Davis Steve Olson's Testimony 
Sworn In 
State: You are employed with the Metro Narcotics Strike Force? 
Olson: Yes, 
State: And aside from that are you a police officer for Salt 
Lake City* 
Olson: Yes. 
State: How long have you been a police officer, sir? 
Olson: Eight years in April. 
State: How long have you been working <with Metro Narcotics? 
Olson: Eight months. 
State: Were you with Metro back in Aug. and July of Last year 
sir? 
Olson: Yes, sir 
State: What were your duties at that time. 
Olson: At the first part of June, I entered Metro narcotics to 
go into a undercover narcotic. 
State: What were your duties? 
Olson: To work undercover and attempt to fight drugs at street 
level and try to gain a little more information to go a 
little bit higher than lust narcotics. 
State: Did you during the course of your work there become 
acquainted with one known as Mike Davis* 
Olson!. Yesf I did. 
I 
State: Would you recognize him if you saw him again? 
Olson: Yes 
State: Is he seated here in the Court? 
Olson: Yes, I see him at the Defense table. 
Def: We will stipulate this as Mr. Davis, your Honor 
Judge: The stipulation is received. 
State: Did these events you are going to describe occur in 
Salt Lake County, Sir? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: When did you first meet Mike Davis? 
Olson: I'm not sure of the exact date, I met him in the summer 
another acquantance where I was purchasing drugs from 
at 3331 South on Sue Street. 
State: At some time did you have some discussion with Mr. 
Davis on purchasing drugs. 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Did you have contact with him on August 4th. 
Olson: I donft have a copy of what happened on August 4. I 
donft know if it is a mixed case or what. The case 
numbers I have pulled from the booking sheet that I 
understand he was charged with. 
State: Do you have an independent recollection of what occured 
on Aug. 4*? 
Olson: No, not really. 
2 
State: May I have just a moment please, your honor. 
Have you had chance to review that, sir* 
This is the report we just finished. The one on Aug 4. 
Def: Objection to that Your honor, he said he had no 
independent recollection of what occured on Aug. 4. 
The prosecutor trying to refresh his recollection and 
hasn't been able to do that. 
State: Have you had a chance to review the report dated Aug 4? 
Olson: Yes, I have. 
State: Does it refresh your memory as to what happened on that 
date? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Can you testify without the use of the report? 
Olson: I believe I can? 
State: To the best of your recollection, what happened on that 
day, please? 
Olson: In the evening of that date I went to Mikefs residence 
on Gregson Ave. and inquired about purchasing some 
marijuana. He told me to meet him at Randyfs house on 
Sue Street so I went back to 3331 Sue Street and 
waited. A Van, Plymouth Van, pulled up. I learned 
that it was Mike's mother driving. He was in the Van. 
State: Who was in the Van? 
Olson: Mike was in the Van also. I walked up to Mike and 
asked him If he was going to get me some Marijuana, He 
said Yes, he and his mother were both going to get 
3 
some. At that point another person that was there that 
I was also acquainted with, a seventeen year old 
juvenile named Walt decided that he wanted 
to come along with us, So at that point, we all got 
into his mothers Van. She was driving. She drove to 
an apartment complex on 215 East about 2850 South, that 
is an estimate address and we went into a pOarking lot 
to the apartment complex and waited. Mike took some of 
the $35 that I had given him and went into the 
apartment. He came out maybe 10 minutes later. He 
told his mother to leave the area. We drove out of the 
apartment complex onto I beleive it was 200 East and 
went to the next cross street South and turned and went 
East bound about 1/2 block. His mother pulled aside 
the rode . At that point Mike handed her a bag of 
Marijuana. I beleive 1/2 ounce. She proceeded to dump 
it out onto a tray and proceed to divide it up. I held 
a baggy out, a small plastic bag and she put my portion 
that I had purchased into the baggy. I believe, I 
don't remember who did it, someone in the Van, either 
Walt or Mike or his mother pulled a pipe out and loaded 
it and was passing a pipe around in the Van smoking 
marijuana. I simulated taking one hit off the pipe and 
told them I didnft want anymore. We then went to the 
Sue Street address. I was dropped off there. Mike got 
out of the Van. I took Mike back to Gregson and he 
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paid me back $10. We agreed that I would give him $35 
and he said he would pay me back $15. When we got back 
to his house he gave me $10 of that $15 
and went back into his house and I left with my 
marijuana. 
State: Did you have contact with him on July 14, Sir? 
Olson: Yes, I did* 
State: Did this occur at or about 3331 South Sue Street? 
Olson: Yes it did, I am referring to my notes. 
State: Can you tell us what occurred on that date? 
Olson: Yes, I went to the Sue Street address, contacted him. 
He was there with Randy, the' owner of the house. I 
asked if I could purchase 1/4 gram of cocaine. I asked 
him if he knew where I could get some. He told me he 
knew of a hooker who sold cocaine and he could get some 
for me. At that point, we got in my vehicle and drove 
approximately 521 East on 800 South in SLC. A female 
white came out to our car, spoke to him briefly. She 
got into my vehicle with us. We drove at her direction 
to 800 South 200 East, a 7-11 there to a pay phone. 
She got out of my car and made a phone call, 1 assume, 
and we waited for several minutes and a vehicle with a 
female black and a male black pulled up in a small 
compact car. The male black got out and she was out of 
my vehicle at that point. They spoke to each other and 
he, the male black, became pretty agitated and he 
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bounded on the hood of my car a little bit and he 
accused both Mike and me of being Narc. At that point 
the female white that was with us she got freightened 
and came back to my car and told us to drive out of the 
area that something was wrong. I backed out and she 
instructed me to drive back to her home at 521 East on 
800 South. I did so. She instructed us to park up the 
street. We let her out in front of her house and we 
were instructed to park up the street a little ways 
which we did. She had money that I had given Mike to 
purchase the cocaine so we were attempting to purchase 
1/2 gram of cocaine. Approximately 5 minutes went by 
and the same vehicle with the male black and the female 
black that was at the 7-11 had come to the house at 521 
East 8th South. Pulled up the female white that had 
been with us ran out to the car and ran back into the 
residence. Mike told me, I think something is wrong, I 
think they are trying to rip us off, we pulled up 
forward to the house, he jumped out and knocked on the 
door of the house. There was some exchange of words 
between him and someone in the house. He came back to 
th^ car and stood by the car. I was sitting in it. A 
male black , not the one driving the car previously, 
but another male black came out of the house, backed 
him up against the car* Made some threats that he .was 
going to beat him up, or something. He handed a paper 
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bindle. He took the bindle and jumped into my car and 
told me lets get out of here. At that point we did. 
He showed me the bindle and told be to drive back to 
3331 South Sue Street. 
State: What happened there? 
Olson: Well, we reached Sue Street. We went into the shed 
that was located behind the house. Randy had a shed 
back there that he stored minor things in. Mike opened 
the bindle. Showed the cocaine to me. Gave me a flake 
of cocaine. Told me you should put in on your tongue 
to taste it. At that point the flake was on my finger. 
I took my finger, flipped it off and pretended to stick 
it into my tongue acting like I was tasting it. He 
told me it was suppose to numb my tongue and I said it 
did. At that point, he told Randy who was also present 
to make anew bindle. He cut a square piece of paper, 
folded it up and Mike took the cocaine and 
divided it into semi-equal portions. Mike divided it 
up, put it in my bindle and at that point He and Randy 
proceeded to shoot the cocaine up with sryinges and 
as they were doing that I just took my cocaine and 
left. 
State: I have no further questions. 
Def. I wish to cross. Mr. Olson, in regard to this last 
thing that you are testifying about, are you saying 
that you saw Mr. Davis shoot the cocaine with a 
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syringe. 
Olson: What I believe. I saw him draw water up and heat up a 
spoon. 
Def. Did you see him shoot anything into his arm? 
Olson: I saw him take the syringe and point it in and he went 
out of the shed by the shed and hung on the side of the 
house. I thought he was going to have a heart attack. 
Def. Hung on the side of the house? 
Olson: Yes, 
Def. And this was all in front of Randy McNabb? 
Olson: Yes. 
Def. Is Randy McNabb charged with this particular charge 
also? 
Olson: I believe he is. I'm not sure. 
Def Well, you would have been the one who would have wrote 
out a complaint against him to the prosecutor. Do you 
remember doing that? 
State: What difference does it make? I object 
Judge Objection sustained 
Def Your honor in terms of the right to cross examine the 
witness, it seems like I have a right to know who was 
present during these transactions* I can ask him 
whether he went down and complained about him. 
State: she is now 
Judge: you can ask 
Def Do you recall filing any complaint with the county 
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attorneys office about Randy McNabb? 
Olson: He has numorous charges, I don't know if this 18 one of 
them. 
Def Is it possible that you got this mixed up with 
Mr.Davis's charges during your investigations? 
Olson: No. 
Def Was anyone else present during the shooting of the 
cocaine. 
0. No, just myself, Mike and Randy. 
Def And you are sure that occured on July 14, in Randy's 
shed • 
0. Yes 
Def Now, as to the charge occuring as to Mr. Davis's 
mother's Van. You initially said that you could not 
remember the charge. 
0. He gave me a specific date. There are approximately 10 
charges on Mike and only 5 were filed. That's why I 
didn't have specific recollection until I looked at the 
report. 
DEf Why were the others not filed. 
0. I guess overkill. I have no idea. It's at the county 
attorney agent, 
def In you report, in your regard to that charge, you 
reported that you left Mike off at some location. Was 
It a Gdrdan lane location? 
0. A what? 
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def Do you still have that report? What was the original 
amount of money that Mike had given you? 
Judge: Are you talking about a specific time? 
def On August 4th in connection with his mother's van. 
0. I gave him, he didn't give me any money, I gave him 
$35. 
def $35 and then he gave you $10 back.? 
0. Yes. 
def So the actual purchase price was not $35 as you swore 
to in your complaint but actually $25. 
def I don't know. I didn't know whether they wanted that 
price or not. I guess it doesn't really matter. I 
guess it was $20. Actually it would have been $20 
because he should have given me $15 back. So the 
purchase price would have been $20 for the 1/4 gram. 
def In you complaint, well I guess you don't have a copy of 
that either. The original cash amount $35. He gave 
you $15 so the original sale price was $20. 
0. Well it was $25 since he didn't give me the other $5 
back. It would have been 
def So that was actually your fault.? 
0. I took the number off the complaint. 
def You forgot about the change that was made? 
<>• Yes. 
def But in that report it indicated that Mike gave you $10 
of the $15 that he owed and you left, no other 
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transactions and you did drop Mike at the address of a 
relative. Do you recall that? 
I don't recall where or what relative it is. 
Well 70U indicate 170 East Garden Lane. 
Then that is where I dropped him. 
Do you recall what relative that was? 
No 
Do you remember that address? 
170 GQtrdon Lane. No, I don't have an independant 
recollection because of the amount of times that I 
drove Mike. The report was written that I went directly 
to our undercover pad. 
Did you keep anyother reports concerning your 
relationship with Mike Davis independent of these 4 or 
5 days that you cahrged him of selling the firugs. 
I have a ledger that I kept. 
And do you have a ledger of when you met him. 
It is in the ledger and I would have to look. 
Did he ever call you on the phone? 
I don't recall. It might be in those notes. I don't 
recall. 
Do you have his ph^ne number. 
I gave him a phone number of our undercover pad. .1 
believe, I am not sure. 
At any time did he ask you if he could get you some 
drugs. 
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If he could get me some? He didn't ask me. 
You didn't ask him. You always asked him* right? It 
was always your initiative. He never brought it up 
In the course of conversation. He would come over and 
say 
But you would bring it up. Did he ever bring it up? 
I don't recall. 
But you don't recall that he ever did. 
no 
You made some testimony as to one address. I believe 
it was the 2929 South 200 East address that you 
testified to. You later found out to be 183 Gdrden 
Street. That is the same address 
Yes 
and who is at that address 
No one now. It is a vacant apartment. 
Well who lived there at the time 
It was a kid I identified as Jimmy Williams 
And that is the person who you think Mr. Davis was 
buying the drugs from. 
He is the one who was with us the night I purchased 
drugs. All three of us were in my vehicle. The ounce 
on marijuana the we divided. 
How about Kevin? Did you run into a person named 
Kevin? 
Kevin was orignally when Mike got into my vehicle 
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I thought he said this guys name is Kevin and it turned 
out to be Jimmy, 
So there wasn't a Kevin 
No. 
Walt, was there ever a Walt? 
Yes. 
And when was Walt present. 
He was present when we went in Mike's mothers van 
Who else was present other that Wait, Mikefs mother, 
Mike and you. 
No other in the van. 
And you quite sure Kevin wasn't present I mean Jimmy 
No, he wasn't. We went to a different location that 
time. We went up the street from Jimmy's house. There 
was another apartment complex we went into the back of 
that apartment complex. 
But they weren't in the Van. 
No Jimmy was never with us. 
Are you denying that a guy named Kevin was present at 
the time that Mike and his mother participated in a 
drug transaction with you. 
I was never acquainted with a man named ^evin that was 
acquainted with Mike. Kevin when they brought him out 
the first time turned out to be Jimmy• 
Well what do you mean by that. You thought his name was 
Kevin. Maybe his name was Kevin. How did he turn out 
13 
to be Jimmy. 
I have identified him since. I have a warrent out for 
his arrest. 
And your warrent is for Jimmy Williams who may in fact 
be Kevin. 
I spoke to his mother. She said his name was Jimmy. 
Does he have a middle name. 
Well I don't know. 
Where did you speak to his mother? 
At her home. 
These other addresses that you have indicated. We got 
Garden Street 2929 South. The 3000 South St. Street 
address that you alledged that a buy took place. Whose 
address is that? 
No that wasn't the 30th State. That was the one by the 
canal. Is that the one your referring to? 
I am referring to the one that you swore under oath 
that a man had unlawfully, agreed or consented to 
distribute drugs to you at 3000 South State Street. 
And I am asking you what address that is? What is 
located at that address? What events took place? 
I donH have a map of the city. I donft have any idea 
what is located at that address. 
Well you swore that something happened there. In regard 
to violation %o the drug laws* 
I would have to know what date. I have 5 cases. 
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def You said it occured July 17. 
0. o k 
def I believe it was one of the first things which you 
testified* 
0. On July 17, it states in my notes on 2929 So. 2nd East. 
def So you have no knowledge of a 3000 South St. 
0 I imagine that was an approximate 
def Maybe if I could refresh your recollection. Here is a 
copy of that account 4 on July 17 at that address that 
the defendant Mike Davis offered or distributed 
marijuana and here is your signature swearing to it. 
Correct? 
0. Yes, it is a typeagraphical error. 
def And you have no knowlege of that. Well here it is 
again on July 17, approximately 1946 hrs. at 3000 south st. 
purchased from Mike Davis $40 of marijuana. 
0. It should be 2929 South 200 East. 
def Do you remember what Mr. Davis was wearing on these 
occasions? 
0. No I don't. 
def Do you remember whether or not he had a mustache? 
0. He might have had a slight one in the summertime. 
def Do you remember when it was that you met him? 
0. Like I say. It may be in my notebook. 
def Do you have it with you. 
0. No, I do not have it with me. 
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def Do you remember how many conversations you had with him 
before you first sold him drugs, 
0, No, not off hand 
def Do you remember the subject of those conversations? 
0. They were just small talk at Randy's house because I 
remember I had already purchases marijuana 
def Do you remember how many minutes of conversation you 
had with Mr. Davis? 
0. No, I don't 
def Prior to him first selling you drugs. Could you tell 
me if it was an hours worth or 10 hours worth, 
0. Well it was less than 10 hours worth, 
def Closer to an hour. 
0. I can°t guess. I would just estimate an hour total at 
the time. 
def Did you keep any record of those conversations? 
0. Minor notes like I say at the time 
def Do you have those notes 
0. I do not have them with me 
def They are available 
0. Yes. 
def Is there anything else you va^t me to ask? No further 
questions, your honor. 
It was then amended that 3000 so State should he changed to 2929 
South 200 East 
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Judge: I will grant to motion to make the amendment 
def. One further question, your honor. Didn't you say 2929 
South 200 East didn't turn out to be an address. 
0. Well that was an estimate, 
def So that turned out to not be correct 
0. 183 East Garden Street, 
def Amended 2nd time 
Judge The address on account 4 would read 183 East on Gcfcrden 
Street. The proable cause statement 
def. I would just like to ask him one more question in view 
of these amendments. Mr. Olson, you were aware of this 
183 East Garden Street address on the day that you 
swore out this warrant were you not? 
0. I don't recall when that was 
def Well If I could refresh your recollection. Here is a 
copy of the warrant that you swore to under oath and 
there is the address listed, right? So in terms of 
confusion of the address of 2929 it didn't seem to 
exist in your mind at the time. 
0. It was just taken from the original report that's all. 
def Those notes that you have in front of you. Is this a 
version of your typed written notes* 
0. Yes. 
def Your honor, I would request a copy of tnose. 1 haven't 
been provided with a copy of those. 
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Judge Granted, 
def That will be all 
Judge You may step down. We will have the defendant bound 
over to the district court for there is probable cause that the 
defendant engaged in selling and distributing drugs to the 
undercover agent on Aug A at 2850 South 215 East. Aug 7 187 
Gdrdan Street. One July 25 on 3331 Sue Street and July 17 on 183 
EAst Gardan Street, and on July 14 at 331 Sue Street. 
Def We still want a hearing on this. 
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ADDENDUM G: Transcript of Joan Davis' 
Preliminary Hearing—Testimony of Officer Steve Olson. 
m 
STATE vs. Joan Davis Steve Olson's Testimony 
Judge: Officer if you will come up and be sworn 
State: Officer, will you state you full naoe and spell your 
last name, please 
Olson: Yes, it's Steven Olson 
State: And where are you employed? 
Olson: Salt Lake City Police Department 
State: And in what capacity? 
Olson: Patrol officer 
State: In August on 1987 were you still employed? 
Olson: Yes, I was. 
State: And in what capacity were you working on August 4, 
1987.? 
Olson: I was assigned to Metro Narcotics strike force. 
State: Prior to that time did you have training in the area of 
drug enforcement? 
Ojson: Yes, on the street. 
State: Were you ever made the aquaintance of a lady by the 
name of Joan Davis? 
Olson: Yes, I did. 
State: Is she in the court today? 
Olson: Yes , I do. 
State: Would you identify her, please? 
Olson: She is seated in the defense table In gray and black* 
Larsen: Stipulate that he has identified the defendant, your 
honor• 
State: Where did you first meet Joan Davis? 
Olson: On Aug. 4. 
State: How? 
Olson: I had been aquainted with her son, who I had met 
approximately one month earlier, 
State: And his name? 
Olson: Mike Davis. 
State: Did he introduce the two of you? 
Olson: Yes, in a way. Not formally. 
State: Did you see her or was with her on Aug A. 
Olson: Yes, I was. 
State: What did you do with her that day. 
Olson: I met with her with her son which was at her residence 
which is 140 Gregson. 
State: Is that is Salt Lake County? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Was anyone else with you or present? 
Olson: Yes, we were outside and Mike and Mrs. Davis and I were 
the only ones that I could see around. And at that 
point when I talked to Mike, I asked if I could 
purchase some Marijuana from him. I had in the past. 
He told me to go to a friends house. 
Larsen: I am going to object to anything he says as heresay, 
your honor. 
Judge: Objection sustained 
State: Without indicating what Mike said, what did you do? 
Olson: 1 went to a friends house on 3331 So. t>n Sue Street 
State: With who? 
Olson: To wait for Mike. 
State: Who did you go there with? 
Olson: Just my vehicle. 
State: Did Mike appear there? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Did anyone else appear there? 
Olson: Yes, his mother. She was driving a Van. 
State: Would you describe the Van. 
Olson: A stripped Van. Dark brown Plymouth Voyager Van. Brand 
new from what I understood at that time. 
State: What happened at this residence at 3331 Sue Street 
Olson: I spoke with Mike again concerning about obtaining some 
Marjuana and he directed me to get into the Van. At 
that point I got into the Van with another juvenile 
that was also at the residence by the name of Walt. 
State: Was the Defendant still driving the van at that time? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Where did she drive you to? 
Olson: We went to an apartment complex located approximaty 
2800 So 200 East in that area. 
State: What happened there? 
Olson: We vent into the rear parking Lot; At that point I 
waited in the Van, Mrs. Davis waited in the Van and so 
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did Walt* I had given Mike $35 to purchase some 
Marijuana for me. He left and vent Into an unknown 
apartment and after about 5 min later he got into the 
Van. 
State: Alright, what happened. 
Olson: He informed me that he had the Marijuana. Showed it to 
me. Mrs. Davis drove us all in the Van out of the 
apartment complex. 
State: Was there a conversation about Marijuana? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Prior to that time? 
Olson: Yes. 
State: Was Mrs. Davis a part of that conversation? 
Olson: Yes she was. 
State: Go ahead. 
Olson: We vent approximately 
State: I guess what I am asking is was there any question 
where you were going when you got to 2800 South 2nd? 
East. 
Olson: No, we were leaving to divide up Marijuana. We had 
purchased a quarter, I believe and ve were each going 
to purchase an 1/8 or have 1/8. 
State: Who is each.? 
Olson. Mrs. Davis and I. At that point ve vent about 1/2 
block east and a little south of the apartment complex. 
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which I put down as 2850 So on 215 Eas• She pulled the 
Van, Mrs. Davis pulled the Van over to the curb* At 
that time, she turned on the interior light and was 
handed the marijuana bag by her son. She had a round 
metal tray and poured the mar on to the tray and 
divided it up into two separate piles. When she 
finished she asked me if the portions she divided were 
fair and I said that was fine and she had me hold the 
baggy up, a small plastic bag and she dumped my portion 
of the marijuana into the bag. 
State: What did she do with the other portion? 
Olson. She kept that on the tray because she had no other 
baggy. And during the time she was dividing it up she 
handed a small portion to her son to load a marijuana 
pipe with. 
State: And did he? 
Olson: Yesf he did. 
State: Was that pipe smoked by any one? 
Olson: Yes that pipe was passed around the Van to everyone in 
the Van. I symalated and all three of them smoked 
marijuana. 
State: Vhere did you go from there? 
Olson: We drove back to 3331 Sue Street where my vehicle was. 
Myself and Mike Davis got out of the Van. I had my 
portion of the marijuana. I drove him to some relatives 
on Gordan lane 
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State: What did you do with the marijuana you acquired? 
Olson: I went imnedicately after dropping Mike off to our 
undercover narcotics pad, the apartment, and wrote a 
reportfsealed the evidence in an envelope, taped it, 
initialed it and put it into a safe. 
State: Did all the incident and all your driving occur in Salt 
Lake County.? 
Olson: Yes it did. 
Judge: Mr. Larsen do you want to crossexamine? 
Larsen: Thank you your honor. 
Larsen: You say you created a report on this matter, Is that 
correct? 
Olson: Yes, I did. 
Larsen: May I approch the witness? Would you look at the 
documents that have been supplied to me by the County 
Attorneyfs office particularly these pages here. Would 
that be your report that you handled? Would you look 
at them? 
Olson: Yes, that is a copy of it. 
Larsen: Was that the only that you created as a report on this 
incident? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: There was no other notes that you have on this 
incident? Is that correct? 
Olson: I had a ledger that I kept on listing contacts that I 
kept. So I could identify them later on. 
Larsen: Do you have that ledger with you. 
Olson: No, I don't. 
Larsen: Do you have that in your possession somewhere? 
Olson: Yes, 1 do. 
Larsen: In your report, do you put things that are significant 
relating to the incident. 
Olson: I put all the facts that occured 
Larsen: This fact about loading the pipe up and passing it 
around is a significant thing? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: And yet you didnft bother to put that in your report, 
did you? Is there anything else that you left out of 
the report. 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: No? 
Olson: Not that I am aware of. 
Larsen: Wasn't Kevin present in the Van? 
Olson: Who? 
Larsen: Kevin, do you know a guy by the name of Kevin? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: On Aug 4, you didn't have anything to do with a guy 
named Kevin? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: Have you looked at your ledger of contacts recently 
that relate back to that period of time? 
Olson: If you are referring to a man that I understood to be 
Kevin and it turned out to be Jimmy Williams. 
Larsen: Was Jimmy Williams in the Van? 
Olson: No, he was not. 
Larsen: Was there anybody that may have been called Kevin in 
the Van? 
Olson: No there was not. The only persons in the Van were 
myself, Mrs. Davis, her son and a guy named Walt. 
Larsen: What was Waltfs last name? 
Olson: I have no idea. We have not identified that yet. 
Larsen: Do you know where Walt lives.? 
Olson: I did. His family has since moved. 
Larsen: This took place on Aug. A. Is that correct.? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: At any other time did you have any other contact with 
Mrs. Davis? 
Olson: I spoke to her once in a while at the house trying to 
contact her son. But other than that, no. 
Larsen: Your main contact was with her son? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: And you said you have done deals with him on prior 
occassions? 
Olson: Yes, I have. 
Larsen: Is it a fact on this occasion that your communication 
was with Mike and Walt didnft you talk with them about 
this deal? 
Olson: Yes. 
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Larsen: Was it your understanding that Mrs* Davis was going to 
drive you over to this apartment complex? 
Olson: She would drive us all over. That is what I understood 
from her son. 
Larsen: Is it a fact that Mrs. Davis didn't give you any money? 
Olson: Nof she didnft give me any money, no. 
Larsen: Did you ever ask her for money? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: Did you ask her to obtain marijuana for you? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: Did she ask you to obtain marijuana for her? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: So Mike Davis gave you the money. You gave the money 
to Mike Davis? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: $35.00? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: When you went over to the apartment complex, you 
testified that Mike went into the apartment complex. 
Your sure that Walt didn't go into the apartment 
complex? 
Olson: No, he stayed in the Van with us. 
Larsen: Did Walt have anything to do with the exchanging of 
money? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: He didn't give you any money or receive any money from 
you? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen; Was your pattern of dealing with Mike Davis was that 
primarily on the weekends? 
Olson: No, I was under cover, all the way under cover so just 
whenever I could get ahold of him. 
Larsen: Aug 4, what day was that on? 
Olson: I will have to refer to my planner, I have no idea. 
Lists Tues. here. 
Larsen: What was the conversation with Mrs. Davis when you were 
in the VAn? 
Olson: We were speaking about Marijuana. Her and Walt and I 
were talking about Marijuana. 
Larsen: Wasn°t her communication with Walt that he should 
straighten out his life and get away from that stuff 
Olson: At one point she said he should get off speed and that 
he should get off speed and all she did was smoke mar 
once in a while and that would be good enough for him 
but that he should get off the hard stuff. 
Larsen: She didn't mention to him to get off the Marijuana as 
well? 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: Is it a fact that after you came back from the 
apartment complex that you drove to a Randy Kanab's 
place? 
Olson: Yes, at 3331 Sue Street. 
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Larsen: And at that time you and Walt and Mike exited the 
vehicle? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: Was Randy home at that time? 
Olson: I think he was, but he did not accompany us? 
Larsen: Did you go into Randy's place? 
Olson: Before hand I was in his yard but we didn't go into his 
place . 
Larsen: Did Mike and You and Walt go into Randy's place ? 
Olsen: No, because I took Mike to his relatives where he 
wanted to go, 
Larsen: Your sure? 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: There was nothing that was distributed with Randy that 
night? 
Olson: No, none whatsoever. 
Larsen: Your testimony was that Randy McNabb was not in the 
Van as well? 
Olson: No, he wasn't. 
Larsen: When did you find out about this new Van and Mrs. 
Davis's interest in this new Van? 
Olson: Pardon, I do not understand the question. 
Larsen Did you talk to Mrs. Davis about her vehicle, her Van? 
Olson: Did 1 ask her about it? 
State: Your honor, I am going to object to this being 
irrelevant. 
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Olson: I donft understand. 
Judge: I don't quite know where we are going. 
Larsen: I am trying to find out about the incident and it was 
my understanding that there was conversation about the 
Van and her ownership of the Van and J am trying to see 
if he remembers that conversation. 
Judge: You may continue. 
Larsen: Do you recall any conversation between you and Mrs. 
Davis regarding the Van. 
Olson: She said that this was a brand new Van that she had 
just bought. 
Larsen: Did you ask her about it? How she made the purchase? 
Olson: Nof not that. I wouldnft ask that type of thing. I 
asked her what she paid for it and things like that. I 
was just trying to make small take. She said it was 
brand new and she was telling us about it. Kinda 
showing it off to us. 
Larsen: What did she tell you about the finances and how she 
paid for it? 
Olson: She didn't say. I think she said it cost $17,000. We 
saved up a long time, or something. 
Larsen: That°s all you recall on the conversation of the Van? 
Olson Yes. 
Larsen: Describe this round tray. 
Olson: It was painted. It looked like something out of the 
house. A serving tray. 
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Larsen: How big? 
Olson: It was round about that big. 
Judge: Witness shows about 17 or 18" in diameter. 
Larsen: Who resides at 140 Gregson Ave.? 
Olson: Mrs. Davis and her son. 
Larsen: Who resides at the 3331 Sue Street? 
Olson: Randy McNabb. 
Larsen: At what point in time did Walt exit the vehicle. 
Olson: When we reached 3331 South Sue Street again. 
Larsen: And that is Randy McNabbfs place. 
Olson: Yes. 
Larsen: Who resides at 2850 South 215 East? 
Olson: Thatfs where we stopped. That is where the Marjuana 
was divided up. 
Larsen: Are there any buildings? 
Olson: Itfs a residential area. We just pulled up to the 
curb . 
Larsen: At the time that you describe the marijuana being 
divided what did Mrs. Davis state at the time.? 
Olson: During the time that she was actually dividing. Mike 
was talking how good she could divide weed without 
scales. Saying that she could do a good job and she 
was just splitting it up on the tray. 
Larsen: Who ask her to divide it? 
Olson: Mike did. 
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Larsen: Was there any conversation as to how much Mrs. Davis 
should have. 
Olson: Yes, it was to be split down the middle. I give them 
$35. My portion was only to be $20. I was actually 
giving him a loan of $15 which he was to give back to 
me when we reached his house when the transaction was 
over. When it was finished, he gave me $10 out of the 
$15 and that's the last I saw of it. 
Larsen: Do you know if Mike had any? 
Olson: Had any? You mean of the marjuana. She gave him a 
small amount to load a pipe with. 
Larsen. Do you recall any other communication with Mrs. Davis 
and yourself? 
Olson: On this occasion? 
Larsen: Yes. 
Olson: No. 
Larsen: Do you recall anyother time you were in her Van? 
Olson: Only when it was seized to search it. 
Larsen: And this was on what day? 
Olson: I think it was the 19th. The 19th of Jan. 1988. 
Larsen: Did you have a search warrant for the Van at that time 
Olson^ No. 
State: Objection, your honor, itfs not relevant. 
Judge. He has already answered 
Larsen: Can 1 just nave one minute your honor.? 
Larsen: Your honor, at this time, I don't have any further 
questions* 
Judge. Any other questions. 
State: I have no further questions, your honor. 
Judge. Thank you, you may step down. 
Other: The state had three other witnesses subpoenad. I 
talked with Mr. Larsen and we agreed to stipulate to 
their testimony. The first would have been 
and this testimony would have been 
stricken because of the chain of evidence second, John 
Hobson and his testimony was the same and I understand 
that this doesnft lock us into their testimony as far 
as a Trial goes. The third was Dave Murdock from the 
State Crime lab and he has provided us with an analysis 
of the substance that he identified as Marijuana and I 
have given Mr. Larsen a copy of that analysis. 
Larsen: The purposes of this hearing, your Honor, we agreed of 
the change as per stipulation. 
Judge: State rests then 
State: Yes sir. 
Any witnesses for the defendant 
Larsen: None your honor 
Judge: Have you advised Mrs. Davis of her rights 
Larsen: Ted, we have talked about that your honor and she chose 
not to testify at this time. 
Judge. That Is your desire, Mrs. Davi6. 
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Mrs. Davis. Yes 
Judge: The records will so show. Both sides submitted. 
It will be the order of this court that Mrs. Davis will 
be bound over to stand Trial in the Third District 
Court Case No 88-10087* 
Mr.larsen will be notified by the court of your 
appearance there. He in turn will notify you. 
Therefore, it is very important that you keep in touch 
with him. 
